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ABSTRACT
The looting of the Iraq National Museum in 2003, the
subsequent debates regarding responsibility for the looting, and
questions concerning the appropriate approach to museum
reconstruction reveal the symbolic power of the museum as an
institution—a power that history has shown to be capable of triggering
division, but nonetheless retains tremendous potential for encouraging
unification.
In the wake of the looting of the Iraq National Museum during
the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, an analysis of the looters, the materials
they stole, and the socio-cultural environment permissive to such
actions reveals that all stakeholders appropriated the museum’s
holdings and the cultural heritage embodied within for the purpose of
preserving competing self-interests.
Much debate arose from these events, with the majority of it
centering on whether the U.S. violated international law and whether a
theory of cultural nationalism or internationalism is most appropriate for
the museum’s recovery. This discussion highlights several
conundrums facing heritage protection and preservation. Dialogue
over U.S. responsibility for the looting reveals the inadequacy of
legislation alone in protecting cultural heritage, while debate between
approaches of cultural nationalism or internationalism as the proper
path forward reveals a tragic tradeoff between what may be ideal for
the global community and what may be in the best interests of the
recovering Iraqi nation.
Despite the museum’s potential to divide, proven many times in
its relatively short lifespan, it nonetheless retains tremendous future
potential to unify. This potential must be capitalized upon by scholars
and policy makers alike to signify a return to normalcy in Iraq and to
preserve its national identity, diversity, and heritage.
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FIXING WHAT HAS BEEN BROKEN:
The United States’ Actions in the Aftermath of the Looting of the Iraq
National Museum during the 2003 Invasion

Introduction and Overview
The subject of looting has been studied from numerous angles,
giving rise to a number of hypotheses concerning the motivations behind it
and the meaning arising from it. Scholarly literature on this topic has
identified four components as key contributors to episodes of looting:
potential looters, an availability of valued goods, an absence of restraining
factors, and a permissive socio-cultural environment.1 Moreover, three
distinct types of looting—namely, economic, symbolic, and selective
looting2—also emerge from the literature.
The phenomenon of looting is problematic because it marks the
general breakdown of public order. It overturns societal notions of private
property and generates illicit networks, or bolsters them where they already
exist, that offend communal notions of legal commerce. Moreover, looting is
also unsettling because of the long-entrenched economic injustices to which it
often responds. In the case of cultural property, looting is especially

1 MacGinty, Roger. “Looting in the Context of Violent Conflict: A Conceptualization and
Typology.” Third World Quarterly. Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004), pp. 861-864.
2 MacGinty, pp. 866-868
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disconcerting because it either destroys artifacts themselves or the context
from which they are drawn, erasing the remnants of centuries of heritage and
limiting the conclusions that archaeologists may draw from the study of
material culture.
The looting of the Iraq National Museum during the U.S.-led
invasion of 2003 is of relevance for all of these reasons. It marked the coming
of years of insurgency with which the U.S. armed forces and the emerging
Iraqi government would wrestle, it highlighted the deplorable conditions
under which much of Iraq’s populace suffered for decades, and it saw the theft
and destruction of thousands of years’ worth of cultural heritage.
This thesis will examine the looting of the Iraq National Museum
with an interdisciplinary lens. It will rely less on anthropological and
ethnographic literature, for this comprises but one avenue of insight into the
events of April 2003. Instead, it will draw upon domestic and foreign heritage
professionals; testimony from current and former members of the U.S.
military, as well as other government agents; international jurisprudence;
journalistic opinion; and other resources. The resources I found approached
this topic in a variety of media and genres—newspapers, museum studies
journals, military history or public management case studies, international law
arguments, etc. It was my feeling that a more inclusive method could reach a
wider audience. In contrast to the many sources that fit into one of these
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channels, this thesis will attempt to integrate them all to address more
wholistically the legal and policy implications of these tragic events for
cultural heritage protection.
To this end, the essay will consult sources that examine the
psychology of looting and apply the findings to the events of April 2003.
Economists and contemporary historians will paint a picture of what led a
people to ransack an institution of their cultural heritage. It will look to the
journalistic coverage from shortly after the looting occurred in order to
identify recurring themes in the Western reaction, and it will augment this
with A1 Jazeera reporting to gauge the Middle Eastern response. Amid the
lamentation that more was not done to protect the museum, this thesis will
look to jurisprudence and legal opinion to examine what legally could (and
thus should) have been done to prevent this catastrophe, and pair it with the
writings of museum and heritage professionals to entertain proposals of what
may be pursued moving forward by way of museum recovery.
The first section of this thesis will conduct an analysis of the
looters and the materials they plundered, the lack of prohibitive factors, and
the permissive socio-cultural environment leading up to the looting of the Iraq
National Museum during the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, and reveal this episode
of looting to have meaning that is both economic and symbolic.
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Looking to these four contributors and the three types of looting to
which they lead is revelatory in the case of the Iraq National Museum. As
expected, all four contributing components were present leading up to the
2003 looting of the Iraq museum. Notably, these contributing factors gave
rise to all three types of looting as the museum’s contents were ransacked. An
analysis of the groups who carried out the looting and the goods that each
respective group chose to pilfer reveals the episode to be a prime example of
both economic and selective looting. Simultaneously, looking to the absence
of restraining factors and the otherwise permissive socio-cultural environment
reveals these events to exemplify symbolic looting.
In these events, we witness distinct stakeholders—invading U.S.
forces, outgoing Baathist officials, museum staff, and Iraqi citizens—having
different competing understandings of cultural heritage, as well as competing
interests in its preservation (or lack thereof). This section will also show that
the conflicts among these four groups over the cultural heritage within the
museum centered on furthering their own competing interests.
The second and third sections of this thesis will examine the debate
that has arisen from these events. I first argue that questions concerning
potential U.S. violations of international law reveal the inadequacies of
modem legislation in protecting cultural heritage. I further maintain that
discussions of the possible museum reconstruction are rooted in cultural
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internationalism or nationalism, and these debates reveal a bitter tradeoff
between acting in the best interest of the global community or that of the
recovering Iraqi nation.
While there is much debate over whether the U.S. violated
international law by failing to protect the museum from looting, both sides of
the debate enjoy a degree of representation within the literature on the topic.
The second section of this thesis will survey a diversity of opinion to show
that, though the reasons justifying their positions vary, several common
themes do emerge.
The primary arguments for the position that the United States did
indeed violate international law focus on readings the intent behind relevant
international tenets, as well as a spirit of national harmony with international
standards. The majority of opinion against U.S. actions constituting a
violation of international law focuses on a more literal reading of the law and
obligations under it, as well as a tendency toward minimal compliance with
relevant doctrine. This study will reveal that relevant legislation at the
national and international levels is not only flawed, but is an inherently
insufficient means to protect cultural heritage. Rather, such legislation must
be augmented by a national desire and legitimate conviction to protect cultural
property in order for any heritage laws to be effective in accomplishing this.

5

The next section will show that the two predominant schools of
thought relating to material culture and preservation are cultural nationalism
and cultural internationalism. A culturally nationalistic approach centers on
the artifacts belonging to the source nation and appeals to a sense of national
heritage, while a culturally internationalist approach centers on the artifacts
belonging to the world as a whole and appeals to a sense of global heritage.
Each has its pros and cons, as well as a number of scholars who
support it as the most appropriate path forward for the Iraq National Museum.
Approaches rooted in cultural nationalism tend to be better for the source
country of the artifacts. Among others, benefits include economic
development from domestic and international heritage tourism, creating or
fostering a national identity, providing a social education in what is deemed
an ideal citizenry, and preserving the future of domestic scholarship.
Approaches rooted in a sense of cultural internationalism are often safer for
the artifacts when the source nation is poorer. They can be preferable for both
the field of study as well as the global community, as they can help ensure a
more widespread exposure to the artifacts and thus help foster a sense of
worldwide heritage.
Despite each school of thought enjoying a considerable degree of
support, the prevailing trend in modern years has been to lean toward
internationalism. Not surprisingly, the literature concerning the reconstruction
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of the Iraq Museum since its 2003 looting has been overwhelmingly in favor
of approaches deeply rooted in a sense of cultural internationalism.
An unfortunate tradeoff, however, emerges from this debate.
Artifacts may be better protected and conserved if removed from areas
plagued by violent strife. They may also be safer in richer nations that can
afford to employ more effective preservation techniques. While this can be
desirable for the artifacts as objects themselves and heritage preservation as a
field of study, it may prove damaging to the autonomy, sovereignty, national
identity, and long-term cultural heritage of the nation from which they hail.
While the heritage may enjoy a larger audience and thus foster a wider
appreciation for Iraq and Middle Eastern culture under the wing of cultural
internationalism, the benefits for the Iraqi populace—a strengthened national
identity and a social education in patriotism and desirable citizenship—could
be sacrificed in times of calamity when the need for such cohesion is keenest.
With these tradeoffs in mind, the fourth section of this thesis will
argue that museums have a tendency to be employed as political instruments,
with the Iraq National Museum being no exception. Ever since its inception,
the Iraq National Museum has had a long history of being employed as a
political tool by British, Baathist, and most recently both American
stakeholders and the new Iraqi government. It will call attention to the
museum’s proven track record of being used to foster a spirit of division, and
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highlight the recurring theme of stakeholders appropriating its collections and
the heritage they embody to further their own interests. It will also argue that,
despite this history, the museum nonetheless retains a tremendous potential to
sow the seeds of a future unification.
This section will recount how use of the museum as an instrument
of politics began with the British formation of modern-day Iraq and
installation of the Faisal monarchy, a time during which Gertrude Bell exerted
a great deal of influence on the formation of the museum and its evolution
within the country’s Ministry of Public Works. It will also communicate how
this practice continued with the Baathist regime’s use of the museum to
legitimize their claim to power by way of connecting itself to the past glories
of ancient Babylon. This section will also show that, during the years of
insurgency that followed the initial invasion, parts of Iraq’s fledgling
government appropriated the museum for the purpose of sowing anti
occupation discord, actively drawing the distinction between Islamic artifacts
and Mesopotamian artifacts and granting permission to loot the former but not
the latter.
All the while, outside of Iraq, the museum was also used as a
device to either condemn or justify U.S. foreign policy amid the 2003
invasion. Opponents and critics of U.S. foreign policy used the museum and
its plight as a device to condemn U.S. war efforts, while those supporting the
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war, on the other hand, voiced an alarmingly wide array of tenuously
supported narratives concerning the looting to justify the U.S. decision to
invade.
Despite this potential to divide, which has been proven in the Iraq
National Museum’s relatively short lifespan, the last section will argue that
the museum and its collections nonetheless retains a rich potential to signify a
return to normalcy within Iraq, acting as a weather vane of progress in
reconstruction, and to foster an Iraqi national identity and sense of pride. It
can give context to the many eras of strife within Iraqi heritage, a context
which can then communicate broader truths to the citizenry concerning broad
elements such as Mesopotamian roots, the Islamic faith, periods of British
colonialism and early nationhood, years of Baathist alienation, and the U.S.
invasion and subsequent new government.
Museums are symbols of power, so it stands to reason that the Iraq
National Museum can legitimize a people just as it has legitimized regimes.
This can, in turn, ensure long-term preservation of artifacts and longevity of
scholarship, as a profound resonance with the populace and a collective
identity or conscience are the first steps in securing the survival of material
culture.
Rather than merely propping up the ruling party’s historical
narrative, the museum can also give special voice to Iraq’s long overlooked
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diversity, even if respective historic narratives are conflicting. This can
include attention to the deeply felt tribal differences and religious differences
ignored by the United States in its war planning. By virtue of predating
modern-day strife, the Mesopotamian period stands poised as a solid common
ground upon which to begin the process of unifying the diverse elements that
comprise Iraqi society.
If national museums are to be considered an outward sign of
independent nations, then the reopening and proper functioning of the Iraq
National Museum will signal this to the Iraqi people and to the world, a notion
the U.S. would do well to support. After all, if this is the United States’ goal
in Iraq—to return the nation to a pre-totalitarian state of affairs—then the
museum’s restoration and proper functioning is equally in the best interests of
the U.S. as of the Iraqis. This unifying potential can and must be capitalized
upon by both policy makers and cultural heritage professionals alike in order
to signify a return to normalcy in Iraq, to solidify its modern twenty-firstcentury national identity, as well as to preserve its rich diversity and ancient
heritage well into future generations.
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I. The Economic and Symbolic Significance of the 2003 Looting of the
Iraq National Museum

The Looting of the INM
Operation Iraqi Freedom—the U.S.-led mission to invade Iraq and
ouster Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime—officially began on March
20, 2003. The first U.S. forces entered the capital of Baghdad on April 5, but
left vacant the Iraq National Museum compound, home of the world’s largest
collection of Mesopotamian artifacts,3 from April 9-12 during the siege.
During this time, the museum was looted, with hundreds of thousands of
antiquities being taken in three devastating waves—though there was likely
some overlap between these waves of theft4—that shocked and enraged the
global community.
The first wave began early on April 10, as a group of organized
professional thieves with information on the location of highly-prized
antiquities entered the compound. It is currently believed that these
professionals entered Iraq just before the war in anticipation of capitalizing

3 Gerstenblith, Patty. “From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultural
Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century.” Georgetown Journal of International
Law. Vol. 37 (2006), p. 288.
4 Vreeke, Dennis. “The Looting of the National Museum of Iraq, Baghdad: How Cultural
Heritage Became War Booty.” McGill University (20 November 2006), p. 3.
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upon the “the opportunity of a lifetime,”5 perhaps stealing and selling “bigticket items” as part of a long-standing arrangement dating as far back as the
First Gulf War.6 This group sought specific pieces and took some of the most
valuable items from the museum’s public galleries,7 as if they were working
from a shopping list.8
The second wave of looting took place later that same day, as a
group of ordinary citizens focused mainly on furniture and electronic
equipment, and attempted to set fire to the administrative and offices, labs,
and record rooms.9 This second group also entered the museum’s public
galleries and removed thirty-four artifacts from the walls and out of display
cases, highly-prized items that were too large for the museum staff to have
moved to safety ahead of time, including the famous 5,000-year-old Sacred
Vase of Warka, as well as the over 4,000-year-old Bassetki Statue, one of the
two Ninhursag Bulls, and the Entemena Statue.10 This wave of looters also
stole indiscriminately from the museum’s more accessible above-ground

5 Rothfield, Lawrence, ed. Antiquities under Siege: Cultural Heritage Preservation after the
Iraq War. Lanham: AltaMira Press (2008), pp. 40-41.
6 Bogdanos, Matthew and William Patrick. Thieves of Baghdad: One Marine’s Passion for
Ancient Civilizations and the Journey to Recover the World’s Greatest Stolen Treasures.
New York: Bloomsbury (2005), p. 215.
7 Hitchcock, Ann. ‘Through the Fog of War in Iraq: Lessons Learned in Heritage
Preservation.” The George Wright FORUM. Vol. 20, No. 4 (2003), p. 29.
8 Bogdanos and Patrick, p. 20
9 George, Donny and McGuire Gibson. “The Looting of the Iraq Museum Complex.”
Catastrophe: The Looting and Destruction of Iraq’s Past. Chicago: The Oriental
Institute Museum (2008), p. 21.
10 George and Gibson, p. 23
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storage rooms, taking items such as the Warka Mask and stripping the 4,500year-old Ur Lyre (one of the world’s oldest surviving stringed musical
instruments) of its gold inlays.11 The true number of items taken may
unfortunately never be known since these areas had yet to be fully inventoried
by the museum staff.
The third and final wave, like the first, was composed of
professional thieves, or perhaps museum insiders. This group “had intimate
knowledge of the museum and its storage practices” and “targeted high-value
items in unmarked cabinets.”12 A1 Jazeera coverage of the looting explicitly
addressed the possibility of museum insiders playing a role in the theft,
implying that staff members who disappeared during war were to blame.13
Other Middle Eastern journalistic pieces also mentioned this possibility, albeit
briefly and as an afterthought to U.S. culpability.14 In any event, this group
broke into areas of the museum whose location was known to few and took
with them some 5,000 pieces of jewelry and 5,000 cylinder seals from early
historical periods.15 These stone cylinder seals were used to sign wet clay
tablets and represent one of the earliest forms of writing, recording many

11 George and Gibson, p. 25
12 Hitchcock, p. 29
13 Priceless museum items go missing. (2003, September 11). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
14 History ... another victim of occupation. (2003, October 23). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
15 George and Gibson, p. 21
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aspects of ancient life, including religious myths, laws and court cases, trade
practices, etc.16 Museum staff returned and finally secured the complex on
April 12 as throngs of journalists arrived, before United States forces
eventually arrived on April 16 to overtake security.
The looting of the museum ignited a media fire storm. Reports
from journalists and heritage professionals of the total number of items stolen
were initially overstated and varied widely immediately following the
securing of the museum.17 Depending on the source, somewhere between
50,000 and 170,000 items were taken in the looting.18 These numbers differ
wildly, largely as a result of the emotional fever pitch from archaeologists.19
These stories all accused the U.S. of acting unilaterally while ignoring
international law governing the protection of cultural heritage. Reporting
from sensationalist press and analysis from journalists ignorant of the social,
cultural, or political realities of the situation20 was also at play.

16 Gerstenblith, pp. 273-274
17 Hitchcock, p. 33
18 Lawler, Andrew. “Mayhem in Mesopotamia.” Science. Vol. 301 (August 2003), p. 585.
19 Joffe, Alexander H. “Museum Madness in Baghdad.” The Middle East Quarterly. Vol.
XI, No. 2 (Spring 2004), p. 31.
20 Cordoba, Joaquin Maria. “On the Iraq Museum and Other Assaults: Brief News about the
Plundering of Iraqi Museums and the Systematic Looting of Iraqi Archaeological
Heritage.” Isimu: Revista sobre Oriente Proximo y Egipto en la Antigiiedad. Vol. 3
(2000), pp. 20-21.
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Although these narratives would be revised some four days later,21
these dramatic initial reports roused the international community into action 22
and U.S. forces began a formal investigation into the events and an effort to
recover stolen items both within and outside of Iraq. As Middle Eastern
media sources would point out, however, “numbers cannot tell the whole
story.”23 The true number of looted pieces likely came to around 15,000;
approximately only 4,000 of them having been recovered to date.24
In the months that followed the looting, many perspectives on the
looting were offered in both the journalistic and academic realms. Accessing
Iraqi perspectives on the looting of the museum has been difficult, with Iraq’s
infrastructure in shambles and there being less opportunity for occupants of a
war zone to voice their opinion than we enjoy in the Western world. Though
the barrier of not speaking Arabic is also a factor, English translation of A1
Jazeera coverage has provided some insight into how the Iraqi people viewed
the looting. Many critics, Western and Middle Eastern alike, blamed the U.S.
for not securing the museum as quickly as it had secured other civic
ministries. Others spun the events as evidence to justify the U.S. invasion,
with a variety of opinions also emerging in between. Amid these myriad
viewpoints, a most common thread, however, emerged—lamentation for the
21 Joffe, p. 37
22 Hitchcock, p. 29
23 Priceless museum items go missing. (2003, September 11). A1 Jazeera.
24 Gerstenblith, p. 290
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loss of these irreplaceable antiquities embodying thousands of years of world
heritage.
Sadly, throughout history, it has not been unheard of for a nation to
devalue the heritage of another that it conquers. The practice has dated back
to the Roman era, and probably earlier.25 Throughout history, victor nations
have pillaged the cultural property of those they conquered, and Iraq has been
no stranger such “predetermined [policies] to destroy the physical memory of
a vanquished enemy.”26 For a population to actively pillage remnants of its
own cultural heritage amidst conflict, however, is a much more uncommon
and exceedingly troubling act that merits examination. Given such a terrible
loss suffered by a world heritage site in the twenty-first century, a subsequent
search for explanation was inevitable.
The subject of looting has thus been examined from multiple
angles, giving rise to a number of hypotheses concerning the motivations
behind it and the meaning arising from it. Sifting through myriad
perspectives, one finds that the focus of these hypotheses is most often to first
identify motivating factor(s) behind the destruction and then to categorize the
destruction that occurred in order to arrive at some semblance of
understanding.

25 Gerstenblith, p. 249
26 Stone, Peter and Bajjaly, Joanne, eds. The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq.
Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press (2009), p. 7.
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Key Contributory Factors to Episodes o f Widespread Looting
There is a wide array of theories on the motivation behind
extensive looting. Readings of literature on the topic reveal a spectrum that
spans from greed to need, but despite this diversity of opinion, sociologists
often find four key components of episodes of looting. These components are
potential looters, an availability of goods that are valued and stand to be
looted, an absence of restraining factors, and a permissive socio-cultural
environment.27 Notably, all four of these factors were abundantly present in
the climate leading up to the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
It is difficult to conceive that any one of these four factors can give
rise to episodes of widespread looting on their own; rather, all four must be
simultaneously present to give rise to such a phenomenon. We can frame the
four contributing factors to looting within a supply-demand model. This
model would predict the supply of valuable items relative to the demand for
them to steer the extent of the looting. The looters—whether random citizens
from surrounding neighborhoods, professional thieves, or regime insiders—
and the stolen goods from the museum comprise the “supply” portion of the
events of April 2003. The demand factors in fostering the looting reside in the
chronic underdevelopment of the nation and a lucrative black market for

27 MacGinty, Roger. “Looting in the Context of Violent Conflict: A Conceptualization and
Typology.” Third World Quarterly. Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004). pp. 861-864.
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antiquities. The overall “unstable and unregulated environment” in which this
supply-demand interaction was able to occur speaks to the lack of restraining
factors and socio-cultural environment generally permissive the plunder of
cultural property from the national museum.28
Potential looters were abundant. In such violent conflicts, “most of
those who can leave the country do.”29 A large number of Baghdad residents
remained in their homes during the invasion, and among them were those
whose economic desperation was and frustration with the Baathist regime was
palpable.30 That is not to say, however, that all residents who remained were
potential looters. Rather, as they were able to assess the conflict’s impact on
their neighborhoods, there were groups among them who interpreted the
relatively small invading force’s lack of intervention in the looting of other
government buildings as proof that the “Americans were unable, or unwilling,
to impose order”31 and as tacit permission to do engage in looting.32
Second, valuable goods were certainly vulnerable to looting within
the museum compound in April 2003. Indeed, much of the city housed items
that could be stolen once the invasion accelerated. While the majority of the
28 Vreeke, p. 3
29 Ferris, Elizabeth and Matthew Hall. “Update on Humanitarian Issues and Politics in Iraq.”
Brookings-Bem Project on Internal Displacement (2007), p. 2.
30 Gawron, Laura. “An Examination of the 2003 Looting of the Iraq National Museum: How
the Protection of Iraq’s Cultural Property Was Overlooked.” Seton Hall University
(2010), pp. 52-57.
31 Gawron, Laura, p. 17.
32 Gerstenblith, p. 288
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population remained in their homes during the siege, elites fled in large
numbers. Iraqi wealth was distributed unevenly, favoring the elites.33 As the
Coalition forces and the Baathist regime struggled against one another, the
vacant enclaves of the rich housed goods ready to be taken and redistributed
among the masses.
Such pillaging required a conducive environment. The remaining
third and fourth factors—the absence of restraining factors and a permissible
socio-cultural climate—made this possible. These third and fourth factors
were interlinked; the perceived absence of restraining forces likely comprised
a main component of a larger climate permissible to looting.
The lack of constraints originated in the conflicting goals and
power struggles of three authorities: the U.S.-led Coalition, the Baathist
regime, and the museum staff. As the Coalition and Baathists fought one
another, the remaining museum staff was unable to secure the help of either in
securing the museum amid the conflict.
Economic depression and a thriving market for Mesopotamian
antiquities made looting an attractive form of generating money for average
Iraqis. The country’s education system did little to build ties between the
populace and the remnants of the region’s Mesopotamian heritage. The
33 Schubert, Samuel. “Revisiting the Oil Curse: Are Oil Rich Nations Really Doomed to
Autocracy and Inequality?” Oil and Gas Business. National Defense Academy in Austria,
Institute for Human and Social Studies (July 2006), p. 8.
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museum’s outward association with the outgoing oppressive regime prompted
Iraqis to devalue the museum holdings. Together, these three factors created
would “combine to create a very volatile situation in which it is perfectly
understandable that large scale looting can happen at any time.”34
The primary economic basis for looting cannot be dismissed. The
effect of poverty on cultural heritage can be devastating,35 and the situation in
Iraq was no exception. Both the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage
and its collections of artifacts certainly suffered “from the effects of economic
hardships caused both by debts from the war with Iran and by comprehensive
sanctions in response to the invasion of Kuwait.”

The collection suffered as

few resources safeguarded its longevity and security.
More tellingly, the general population felt the effects of
unemployment, poverty, and hunger as a result of the international sanctions
and isolation from the international community stemming from Saddam
Hussein’s actions. On the eve of the 2003 invasion, poverty and jobless rates
continued to inhibit economic and social progress. Throughout the 1990s,
nearly two-thirds of Iraqis were dependent on government food rations, some
twenty percent of the population lived under the UNICEF definition of

34 Stone and Bajjaly, p. 107
35 Gerstenblith, p. 350
36 Russell, John M. “Efforts to Protect Archaeological Sites and Monuments in Iraq, 20032004.” Catastrophe: The Looting and Destruction of Iraq’s Past. Chicago: The Oriental
Institute Museum (2008), p. 29.
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“extreme poverty,” more than one million children went malnourished, and
sanitation suffered.37 This extreme poverty was not limited to Baghdad and
other cities. Outside of the cities, many were unable to sell their crops and
one of the few means of survival was providing the goods demanded by
antiquities dealers.38 Antiquities were a ready, nearby, and easily liquidated
asset. Under the same conditions in 1994, as former head of the State Board
of Antiquities and Heritage Mu’ayyad Sa’id noted, “The priority [then was]
how to feed the people.”39 In 2003, many citizen looters similarly responded
to such dire conditions by looting the museum, as well as other institutions of
cultural heritage and archaeological sites outside of Baghdad, hoping to sell
artifacts to “obtain additional income due to chronic underdevelopment.”40
Encouraging these sales was a well-established black market in
antiquities comprised of private collectors, tourists, art dealers, museums, and
even terrorist organizations 41 Illicit trade in antiquities has met punishment
with severity in Iraq since 1958, though it was revived after the First Gulf War
in 1991.42 Prehistoric artifacts of the Mesopotamian past were known to fetch
a particularly high price. For instance, some private collectors had been able
37 Harding, Scott. “The Sound of Silence: Social Work, the Academy, and Iraq.” Journal of
Sociology and Social Welfare. Vol. 31, No. 2. (2004), pp. 183-184, 186.
38 Stone, Peter. ‘The Identification and Protection of Cultural Heritage during the Iraq
Conflict: A Peculiarly English Tale.” Antiquity. Vol. 79 (2005), p. 938.
39 Joffe, p. 33
40 Vreeke, p. 4
41 Vreeke, pp. 5-8
42 Gawron, p. 46
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to purchase small artifacts that exist in greater number, such as stone cylinder
seals that record ancient life’s religious beliefs, civic administration, and trade
activities for $200—a sum not insignificant to an impoverished citizen of
Baghdad—with the knowledge that they could in turn be sold for at least ten
times that amount, while larger objects have been sold for prices upward in
the millions of dollars.43 Arab-centric media sources have highlighted this
“steal to order” system by which wealthy collectors exploit “penniless
villagers.”44
Amid such dismal conditions, the opportunity to sell antiquities
that were likely to fetch a lucrative price on this black market became an
attractive means of either providing sustenance or augmenting an existing but
inadequate income. This has been evidenced by investigators’ interviews with
some of the perpetrators as museum pieces were recovered ultimately
revealing the true motive to have often been selling the artifacts to private
collectors, art dealers, or corrupt curators, and it has been argued by
economists studying the chronic poverty and underdevelopment amid which
these perpetrators lived.45 Many scholars have noted that this black market
and the “destruction of [the] cultural infrastructure of Iraq” acted together in

43 Vreeke, p. 7
44 Stealing undiscovered history in Iraq. (2004, April 14). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.alj azeera.com/.
45 Vreeke, pp. 4, 6-8
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paving the way for much of the widespread looting of the museum
• compound.46
Due to this economic dimension to the looting, Arabic media
coverage rarely depicted the looting of the museum specifically. In fact, by
2006 and 2007, timelines of the war’s key events published by 2006 did not
mention looting at all,47 and neither did evaluations of Bush administration
strategies to date.48 What coverage did mention the looting highlighted how it
inhibited oil production and the receipt of foreign aid in Iraq,49 and how it was
symbolic of the greater breakdown of order.50
Additionally, the national school curriculum of Baathist Iraq
played a strong role in the population’s path to looting. Iraqi schools
minimized connections between the populace and their Mesopotamian
heritage as preserved in the museum’s collections. Prior to the 2003 invasion,
Iraq had in place an established public education system, though disparities in
education became apparent for many citizens after the age of fourteen. This

46 Hamilakis, Yannis. “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Military-Archaeology Complex: Iraq,
Ethics, and Neo-Colonialism.” Archaeologies: Journal of the World Archaeological
Congress (14 February 2009), p. 10.
47 Timeline: Conflict in Iraq. (2006, March 20). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
48 Bush strategies in Iraq to date. (2007, January 11). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.alj azeera.com/.
49 World Bank struggles with Iraq finances. (2003, August 2). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http ://www. alj azeera.com/.
50 Iraq recovers lost artefacts [s7c]. (2010, September 21). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
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education was primarily Islamic in focus, with little inclusion of the nation’s
prehistoric heritage. Only one year of the entire ten years of required public
education devoted any time to Mesopotamian history, and this cursory glance
occurred at age twelve. “This [was] the only opportunity that pupils [had] to
study ancient Mesopotamian history,” and students were arguably too young
to identify with long lists of unfamiliar names and events, so “most pupils
forgot about it completely” after being “taught about it, just for one year.”51
As a result, few Iraqis had any extensive knowledge or investment in their
material heritage, and museum professionals have reaffirmed that these
“looters did not know much about these ancient peoples.”52
It stands to reason that citizens with a sense of pride and ownership
in a museum are more likely to protect it than they are to loot it, and
successful cultural heritage preservation depends heavily on resonating with
the population at large.53 Granted, being vested in heritage may not
necessarily be enough to overcome designs for survival amid the poverty and
oppression that prompted much of the looting. These factors are likely
unequal, with survival seemingly outweighing appreciation for heritage under
dire enough conditions. Nonetheless, increasingly widespread feelings of

51 Stone and Bajjaly, p. 106
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ownership in national heritage bode more favorably for cultural heritage
protection than the alternative.
Furthermore, the museum as an institution had built irrevocable
ties to the Baathist regime. Archaeology has long been “a powerful tool to
bind the multiethnic Iraqis together, as some of the country’s early leaders
were not slow to recognize,”54 including the Baathists, as their regime had
made considerable effort to connect itself to the nation’s Babylonian heritage
as a means of legitimizing its authority. Upon coming to power in Iraq,
Saddam Hussein focused heavily on archaeology, specifically that from preIslamic periods of history to foster Arab unity and unify diverse elements in
the region. Like many rulers, Saddam recognized that heritage could
contribute to a nation’s identity and esteem, and he deployed it to legitimize
his “modern government’s claims as heirs to an ancient past.”55 As I later
discuss in more detail, this mainly entailed the rebuilding of archaeological
sites and incorporating archaeological themes into public persona.56 In fact,
the Baathist government’s slogan was “Yesterday Nebuchadnezzar, today

54 Giannuzzi, Timothy. Book review of Magnus T. Bemhardsson’s “Reclaiming a Plundered
Past: Archaeology and Nation Building in Modem Iraq.” The American Journal of
Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 23, No. 2 (2006), p. 118.
55 Cuno, James. “Antiquity Belongs to the World: Archaeology Must Be Shielded From
Nationalistic Laws And Politics.” The Chronicle of Higher Education Review. Vol. 54,
Issue 43 (2008), p. B9.
56 Bemhardsson, Magnus T. Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation
Building in Modem Iraq. University of Texas Press, 2006, pp. 215-216.
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Saddam Hussein.”57 The museum was a vital piece in this plan, and use of it
for this purpose reached particularly visible heights under Saddam’s rule, with
him outwardly employing regime loyalists at high levels within the museum
and displaying himself prominently within its exhibits to solidify this link
between his present rule and that of the past, presenting his reign as the
culmination of these previous empires.58
Given the regime’s focus on Mesopotamian heritage in the
museum, it is strange that the schools did not stress this heritage in their
curriculum. Paradoxically, ignorance of this history was advantageous to
Saddam. Since “the general public was not too familiar with the basic facts of
that history, as it was with Islamic history, and the Mesopotamian stories were
not enmeshed in popular culture,”59 Saddam was able to present the
Mesopotamian narrative to the public as he wished through the museum and
archaeological sites. Acting as the keepers of this historical narrative and the
sole source of dispensing it resulted not in wonder and allure from the public,
but instead propaganda, as evidence by the 2003 looting and destruction.

57 Cuno, p. B9
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Resulting Types o f Extensive Looting
These four elements that contribute to episodes of widespread
looting have been shown to interact and give rise to three distinct categories of
looting. These three types of looting are economic, selective, and symbolic.
It can be argued that all looting is economic, selective, and symbolic; in other
words, episodes of looting simultaneously assume these dimensions. By way
of definition, the differences between looting’s dimensions are discussed
below.
First, economic looting is the most basic type of looting. It
involves the looting of objects that satisfy an absolute need, such as food,
shelter, or clothing, as well as goods that can be sold in order to satisfy these
more basic needs.60 The driving force behind this type of looting is the need
for either the items themselves or for goods that can be purchased with funds
gained by selling the stolen items. In this light, the phenomenon of economic
looting can be seen more as a civic uprising or strategy of survival than mere
pillaging, as a significant portion of the populace so direly lacks necessities
that it feels compelled to seize them for itself.
By the outset of the invasion, Iraq’s population had endured years
of poverty and privation. Leading up to the U.S.-led invasion, international
sanctions enforced against Saddam Hussein since 1990 led to more than one60 MacGinty, pp. 866-868
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fifth of Iraqis in densely-populated regions being unable to meet basic needs
over long periods of time, declining food self-sufficiency and endemic
malnutrition, and the degradation of Iraq’s once-advanced healthcare delivery
system.61 All the while, Iraq enjoyed abundant oil resources. In fact, in 2003,
Iraq had 112 billion barrels of crude oil reserves—the world’s second largest
endowment, totaling eleven percent of the global total—and averaged
production of 10.5 million barrels per day.62 Less than five percent of this
wealth, however, ever went to the Iraqi people; instead, it funded the military,
palaces, and the Hussein family’s lifestyle, producing “a very high level of
acute poverty and starvation” for the rest of the population in which the
majority of “the Iraqi people live well below the World Bank definition of
poverty.”63 When oil resources were meant to provide some relief via the Oilfor-Food program, this proved a “poor replacement for a functioning
economy,” as the sanctions crippled Iraq’s oil refinery structure and made it
impossible to fulfill its quota in exchange for other goods, with the receipts
often being slow to arrive, defective, expired, or spoiled.64
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This environment ultimately constituted “the perfect storm” for the
looting of Iraqi antiquities.65 Looting took place to sell antiquities on the
black market to either feed or augment incomes. Archaeologists with
experience in Iraq have noted that “archaeology is a convenient means solve
such problems for poor Iraqis and their families. Many peasants see fields of
pottery that you can dig up when you’re broke ... To poor Iraqis, there isn’t
much difference between working in a field and digging in a site—it’s all
work, and work brings money.”66 In this context, we can understand looting
as an act of desperation and self-preservation.
The black market comprised of private collectors, art dealers,
museums, and even terrorists organizations was there to “take full advantage
of people’s ignorance, hatred, and suffering.”67 Depending on their wealth,
private collectors purchase either well-known artifacts for their own
enjoyment or lesser known items either as simple souvenirs or for their resale
ZTQ

value.

Art dealers purchase a significant amount of looted artifacts and sell

them to museums; indeed, history has shown museums to “have always been
involved in the purchase of stolen or looted art.”69 Following the invasion of

65 Russell, pp. 29-31
66 Gawron, p. 53
67 Rothfield, pp. 54-55
68 Vreeke, pp. 6,19
69 Vreeke, pp. 7-8, 21

29

Iraq, a number of terrorist groups even also dealt in antiquities stolen from the
museum to gain access to cash or weapons.

70

Despite the evidence of widespread economic motive, reports
emerged that Iraqi citizens seized the artifacts for altruistic reasons; foreign
journalists reported that Iraqis regularly expressed appreciation for the
artifacts and a desire to safeguard them from harm. As antiquities cannot be
properly displayed in the average Iraqi home, motives for theft are not likely
aesthetic or curatorial. Hiding the artifacts from both the invading Coalition
forces and defending Baathist forces, however, seemed a more likely
possibility. Reports of looters’ intent having been to secure the objects until
proper order could be restored were indeed more common. For instance, a
nearby resident returned two high-profile items—one of the twin copper bulls
from Ninhursag and a four-foot statue of the Assyrian King Shalmaneser III—
that he claimed to have taken for safekeeping. Outside of Baghdad, ordinary
citizens helped the Chief Librarian at Basra’s Central Library save some
seventy percent of its collections before the institution was looted and
burned.71 Though they may not comprise the lion’s share of looters, those
citizens who looted with altruistic intent demonstrated recognition of the
sacred value of cultural property. The act of removing the collection items
was meaningful; it declared the artifacts and the heritage embodied in them to
70 Vreeke, p. 7
71 Hitchcock, p. 37
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be the property of the Iraqi people rather than of the belligerents or even of the
museum itself.
Heroic as these actions may have been, such incidents do not
represent the majority of thefts. As Colonel Bogdanos, the military official
leading the United States’ end of the museum recovery effort, would observe,
nearly everyone that they encountered claimed to have taken something for
safekeeping, much like nearly every criminal a district attorney encounters
claims to be innocent.72 That being said, Col. Bogdanos has a bias that could
not be ignored. As a member of the U.S. armed forces and career criminal
investigator, his outlook was presumably predisposed him to search for
alternatives to American guilt. Further, the average Iraqi’s disconnection with
the ancient Mesopotamian past commemorated by the museum would also
preclude this sense of ownership of the cultural property to have been felt on a
widespread scale. Without widespread education in the region’s
Mesopotamian legacy, as previously discussed, there can be little hope for the
appreciation of the heritage that the artifacts embody. The overall aim of the
masses in looting, therefore, would appear to be fiscal gain to satisfy personal
and family needs. These conflicting testimonies that resulted, however, likely
exposed each party’s desire to discredit the others in the aftermath of the
looting.

72 Bogdanos and Patrick, p. 151
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Second, selective looting, however, is more discriminating than
mere economic looting. While the economic motivation behind it remains the
same, it differs in that it requires that looters pay particular attention to a
targeted selection of materials.73 The choice of certain items over others
merits attention to why such items were preferable.
Professional thieves in the first and third waves of looting engaged
in selective or connoisseurial looting. These thefts targeted particularly
renowned artifacts of notable value were targeted for removal from the
museum. Thieves took only the most valuable items in an organized and
selective manner, bypassing replicas and less valuable objects.74 Other pieces
were taken from areas of the museum complex where only a few individuals
had access; comparatively sophisticated tools may have been used in their
removal.75 These particular groups of looters were smaller in number than the
masses who committed the second wave of indiscriminate looting, and took a
comparably smaller amount of artifacts. While the monetary worth of these
prized artifacts certainly attracted this particular wave of looters, their sacred
value did not. Such thievery offers some of the most apparent evidence of the
intense opportunism at play in the 2003 looting of museum.
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Symbolic looting, in contrast to economic and selective looting,
has less of a fiscal motivation behind it. This type of looting has as its
motivation the desire to possess items that embody an administration or
regime.76 The end goal, then, is to destroy or re-appropriate the objects for the
purpose of symbolizing a dramatic change in power, venting anger against the
outgoing regime, or punishing its members by erasing their remnants from the
collective memory.
The gaping void in security in Baghdad in April 2003 gave the
populace the opportunity to engage in symbolic looting. The United States’
narrow focus on taking the city left a veritable gap in power in which the
looting was able to take place. The U.S. military could certainly have acted as
a restraining force; its vast numbers, sophisticated weaponry, and systematic
method of securing other parts of the city attest to this. Many critics in both
the heritage and policy arenas have noted that “in this age of scrupulously
organized invasions, precision bombing, and military planners, there was no
reason that the Iraq Museum could not have been protected”77 and that, given
“the swift securing of the Oil Ministry, the claim that similar provision for the
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museum was beyond American capacity simply [was] not credible.”

no

Such

capabilities and advancements, however, proved hollow as U.S. authority
solely focused on the singular primary goal of militarily taking and occupying
the city of Baghdad and securing its other civic ministries. The Coalition’s
“focus of attention” was on “battling a determined resistance and restoring
security” instead of “stopping desecrations like ... looting.”79 To U.S. forces,
the museum did not merit protection, thus proving that the war’s planners and
implementers did not value the museum’s contents.
The Iraq National Museum lay directly across the street from an
elite Special Republican Guard compound and was along the approach to the
al-Ahrar Bridge crossing the Tigris, an avenue vital to military transportation.
It was also remarkably close to a key intersection crucial to supporting combat
in the urban area. As a result, there was indeed a U.S. unit in very close
proximity to the museum, but this unit, by virtue of their location, had orders
from senior officers to secure this intersection to ensure support during the
ensuing combat. Commanders ordered this unit not to shift focus to guarding
the museum because the primary objective of taking the city outweighed
this.80 While this question was likely raised in planning the invasion, the
point of disconnection between planners and troops on the ground has yet to
78 Sandholtz, Wayne. “The Iraqi National Museum and International Law: A Duty to
Protect.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 44 (2005), p. 237.
79 Stealing undiscovered history in Iraq. (2004, April 14). A1 Jazeera.
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be pinpointed. For this, high-ranking officials must assume more blame than
ground troops who are obliged to obey orders from above. Tragically, since
the preservation of cultural heritage was not included in the invasion’s
primary goal, the museum suffered the consequences.
While much blame rests on U.S. shoulders, Baathist forces are not
immune to culpability. The Baathist focus on repelling the invaders did not
distract them from securing the museum in the midst of the destruction. In
fact, quite the opposite took place. A group of Iraqi soldiers had essentially
fortified the museum compound, though not for the purpose of defending its
collections; rather, the intention was to take capitalize upon its advantage in
attacking Coalition soldiers as “Iraqi troops began to use the museum, with its
prime location in central Baghdad, as a stronghold” to fight the invasion of
Coalition troops.81 The parapet above the Children’s Museum and other
positions were advantageous for anti-Coalition snipers, and were employed
for these respective ends. Arriving at the museum after the looting, U.S.
Marines found Iraqi military uniforms, rocket-propelled and hand grenades,
and rifles and other small arms scattered throughout the museum.82
In a direct violation of the Geneva Convention, the Baathists had
made the museum itself a weapon against the invading forces. Doing so
81 Willis, Lindsay. “Looting in Ancient Mesopotamia: A Legislative Scheme for the
Protection of Iraq’s Cultural Heritage.” Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law. Vol. 34 (2005), p. 225.
82 Bogdanos and Patrick, p. 5
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attracted return fire and openly invited destruction upon the museum complex.
This is evidenced by the numerous bullet holes in the compound walls, the
large hole in the Assyrian gate leading to the Children’s Museum made by a
U.S. tank round, and other damage to stone columns.83 As the invasion
progressed and the likelihood of victory diminished rapidly, many of the
Republican Guard abandoned their mission to save their own lives.
Aside from the invaders and defenders, the remaining museum
staff had entirely independent goals. Their main focus was to protect the
collections of the museum, as well as to safeguard themselves and their
families. The remaining staff made many preparations for the invasion.
They intended to stay in the basement of the museum to defend the
collections, and had stockpiled enough food and water to last them for two
weeks.84 Dr. George also distributed weapons to his staff to fend off looters,
and the museum staff padded large items to withstand the shock of bombing
and moved some particularly valuable pieces to secret locations as the
invasion loomed closer.85 Ultimately, however, the staff abandoned these
plans to defend the museum when they saw heavily armed members
Revolutionary Guard enter the compound in anticipation of a significant
battle. They locked the museum and fled its grounds for safety on the east
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side of the Tigris River, intending to return in a few hours, but U.S. troops
closed all the bridges and they would not be able to return for five days.

Rf \

Despite these preparations, the escalating level of violence forced
them to vacate when it became clear that the museum compound would
become part of the battleground. Shortly after, the looting began. The staffs
personal safety and that of their families took precedence over defending the
museum collections. The subject matter expertise and passion of thenDirector of the Iraq National Museum Dr. Donny George and his staff are
laudable. While the preparations made by the staff to protect the artifacts
ahead of the conflict are laudable, due to the collapsing security all around
them, they were forced to withdraw their presence from the compound,
regrettably leaving the museum defenseless.
Compounding the power vacuum, looters were also emboldened
since the Iraq National Museum was so strongly linked to the Baathist regime.
The connection between the museum and the Baathist administration was a
notion that the U.S. administration regrettably did not expect, but one with
which it would struggle greatly. Unfortunately, institutions of cultural
heritage are often just as much targets as they are symbols.87 What U.S. war
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planners did not comprehend was how strongly “many Iraqis would equate
museum looting with stealing from Saddam, and not from themselves.”88
Under Saddam’s reign, the museum progressed to become “an
official agency of the Iraqi government.... synonymous with the Baath
party” with Saddam himself effecting this outcome as “everyone who worked
at the museum had served at the pleasure of Saddam Hussein.”89 Not only did
he feature himself prominently within the museum’s exhibits, Saddam also
outwardly employed regime loyalists at high levels within the museum. One
particular senior museum official, Dr. Hana Abdul Khaliq, enjoyed senior
Baath party membership and was the sister of #41 on the Coalition’s Top 55
most wanted list.90 Also giving the appearance of corruption was the fact that
another high-ranking official at the museum, Dr. Jaber Khaleel Ibrahim alTikriti (the Chairman of the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage), was
later revealed to be a senior Baath party official, leaving a “cloud [hanging]
over the museum.”91 To illustrate how the Iraqi people understood this, one
need only recall how the U.S. Marines in charge of recovering and rebuilding
the museum’s collections after the looting encountered a riot after allowing
Jaber to aid in museum reconstruction efforts. It became apparent that “the
average Iraqi harbored an enormous amount of anger against anyone who was
88 Gawron, p. 56
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(or was merely thought to be) connected to the Hussein regime,”92 and the
Iraq National Museum was so entrenched in the Baathist regime that scores of
Iraqis assembled to voice their bitter displeasure with signs reading “Jaber is a
dictator!” and “Remove all Baath party members!”93
To provide deeper context, the regime had continually used the
museum to “strengthen [its] sense of attachment to a glorious past.”94 From
this connection, they thus sought to legitimize their brutal wielding of power,
though the 2003 looting would later show that this legitimization attempt had
failed. The logic was that if the Baathists were the inheritors of
Mesopotamia’s magnificent legacy, then their wielding of power was
somehow justified. More importantly, as is customary for totalitarian
regimes, it was not to be questioned by the populace. In this sense, the Baath
party was thus able to exploit artifacts and works of art—objects that would
be praised for their rarity and beauty in any other setting—to do the work of
propping up their brand of oppression.95
Saddam Hussein had long made plain his understanding that
cultural heritage was a prop to political power, most notably when he began
rebuilding the ancient cities of Babylon and Nineveh in 1983. The regime
92 Bogdanos (2005), pp. 500-501
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stamped the bricks in the reconstruction with “in the reign of the victorious
Saddam Hussein, the President of the Republic, may God keep him, the
guardian of the great Iraq and the renovator of its renaissance and the builder
of its great civilization,” just as the original bricks were stamped with the
name of Nebuchadnezzar II in 605 BCE.96
Indeed, Baathist use of the museum reached particularly visible
heights under Saddam Hussein. While all history is politicized, this was
particularly true under Saddam’s rule. The most obvious indication of this
was the prominent placement of portraits of Saddam in the museum’s grand
rotunda, far too high to have been either taken or defaced by the masses
during the looting.97 Placing Saddam’s likeness in the context of the galleries
that displayed these ancient treasures associated him with the reigns of
Hammurabi, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar and Saladin, declaring him to be
their “modern day” counterpart.98 Further, his likeness’ elevated position
relative to the artifacts implied Saddam’s ownership of them and his
importance over them. In addition to the upper echelon of the staff serving
according to his personal pleasure, Saddam “raided the holdings over and
over,” so much so that U.S. efforts to assess the damages were slowed by the
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level of pre-invasion disarray directly attributed to Saddam." To academic
purists, Iraq’s “pre-Islamic Mesopotamian past” thus served the role of
“reflecting glory on his present-day secular tyranny.”100
Since the museum and its collections had come to represent the
Baathist regime, the long-denied masses acted to re-appropriate the artifacts
for their own purposes. The looting of cultural heritage symbolically
“removed vestiges of Iraq’s p a s t... indicating that a new reality was in place,”
as the “recent experience and memory of a repressive and ruthless government
... necessitated a clean break from the past.” 101 Looting was indeed a means
to this end. By destroying items that symbolized regime strength, citizens
erased this power. By stealing and selling such items for their own benefit,
citizens lay a new claim to them and effectively reverse the previous power
relationship. In this context, this act was a significant gesture.
There was a prevailing cultural sentiment among the Iraqi people
that stealing was permissible, as long as it was from the government. This is
because the Iraqi nation had long been taught “that its wealth was or the Arab
Nation first, second for those who governed and their families, then the
military, and then last were the people;” thus, the people’s “awareness that
[they] came last in the minds of the governing elite led to an understanding
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that it was acceptable for [them] to steal from government properties.”102 In
Iraq, ordinary citizens “[were not taught] that government was supposed to
administer and protect the wealth of the people on their behalf,” so the citizens
of Baghdad understood that what was in the museum “was the property of the
government, just as were the contents of any other government office or
building,” and considered it “completely reasonable to take this property, just
as people were taking—looting—from other government institutions and
offices.” 103 In the words of Dr. George himself, “Most of [the looters] were
not educated, and to them the museum was just one more government
building.”104 This does not reflect well upon the museum staffs efforts to
educate the Iraqi populace of its Mesopotamian heritage; rather, it indicates
them having played a more effective role in propping up the Baathist regime.
The implication of this sanctioned theft was that the property being
stolen belonged to the Baathist regime, not to the citizens. The museum
compound had thus become the site of a widespread expression of anger and
frustration with years under Baathist rule. In this sense, the Baathist regime
had not only alienated throngs of Iraqis from their own past, but also
prevented them from having a stake in the nation and its heritage. This
reveals the looting of its collections to be much more than simple pilfering;
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rather, it is more like an act of “wholesale iconoclasm.”105 “The masses
sought to destroy something near and dear to Saddam’s heart.”106 The act of
looting gave the lower classes a rare outlet of expression of emotions such as
anger, hatred, or frustration with years of economic and social repression
under Baathist rule, as they destroyed the museum’s administrative areas and
ransacked its galleries and collections.

Stakeholders with Competing Self-Interests and the Devaluing of Cultural
Heritage
In the events of April 2003, four stakeholders—the invading
forces, Baathists, U.S. officials, and citizen looters—appropriated the museum
and its collections in order to further their own competing interests and de
prioritized cultural heritage in the process.
The decisions made by key U.S. war planners exposed their
institutional belief that cultural heritage mattered far less than other civic and
physical assets. While agents of the U.S. claim to have had a concerted plan
to protect the museum, it was regrettably plagued and rendered ineffective by
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“misunderstandings, mistakes, surprises, and bureau infighting.”107 Put
simply, any lack of clarity manifested cultural heritage’s low priority.
U.S. complicity in the looting was apparent; those observers
tempted to blame the U.S. for the destruction have well-founded claims, given
that the U.S. failed to prevent the looting in the first place or to stop it once it
had commenced, despite having the resources to do so. A1 Jazeera noted how
“looting and lawlessness swept Baghdad and other parts of the country after
the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, often as U.S. forces stood by.”108
Failure to protect the museum also reinforced the Iraqi people’s belief that the
U.S. only cared for its own culture,109 that its concern for Iraqi heritage was
disingenuous,110 and that it was completely unaware of the cultural differences
that exist between the U.S. and Iraq.111 For Iraqis, the U.S. enabling the
looting suggested that the key U.S. motivator in the invasion was vanquishing
an enemy, as opposed to liberating a people, as official U.S. doctrine had
declared.
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By securing other civic institutions—such as the Ministry of Oil
and some of Saddam’s palaces112—before securing the museum, U.S. officials
reveal their indifference to the museum. The low priority they assigned to
protecting the museum in comparison with that they assigned to securing
healthcare and energy resources, among others, reveals its secondary status.
“When marines entered the city ... cultural property became a secondary
concern” as the U.S. “ultimately deemed protecting the cultural heritage of the
Iraqi people of lesser importance than dismantling the remnant of the Baathist
regime, securing Saddam Hussein’s palaces and the Oil Ministry, and making
the city safe for American soldiers.”113 This exposes the U.S. ignorance or
dismissal of cultural heritage preservation’s and collective memory’s roles in
society.
Second, in contrast, the Baathist government’s attention to cultural
property reveals the belief that cultural heritage is indeed of importance, but
not above being bent and reformed by their own agenda in the ensuing
struggle for security. As with the United States, it is also unfair to accuse the
Baathist government of not valuing cultural heritage. After all, this was a
regime that invested great effort in linking themselves to an expansive lineage
of Mesopotamian leadership. For many archaeologists, “Saddam Hussein
112 Willis, p. 226
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developed a reputation as a faithful steward of Iraq’s cultural heritage.”114 As
one Harvard scholar noted, “He [believed] he [belonged] to a history going
back to ancient times .... so destroying it [did] not fit in with his selfimage.”115
Prior to the First Gulf War, the Baathist government in Iraq
“managed its cultural heritage resources, particularly its archaeological
heritage, very successfully.”116 During his reign, Saddam Hussein encouraged
archaeology in Iraq, refused partage (the practice by which foreign
universities retained a portion of their findings to take home with them), and
even sought to recover items removed under earlier regimes, claiming that
these prior rulers did not “grasp the importance of these antiquities,” which he
called “the treasures which are the symbol of the first and greatest civilization
in human history.”117 All of this changed with the Baathist invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 and the resulting war, sanctions, poverty, and isolation that
would follow.
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The museum remained closed for much of the 1990s, as well

as after the 2003 looting,119 making the “non-profit museum almost never
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open to the public .... Saddam’s private treasure house” for more than twenty
years.120
The Baathists subjugated the sacredness, educational value, and
pride of their antiquities to their own claim to power. Such actions
“[imposed] nationalist characteristics on antiquity” and “[distorted] the truth
of culture.”121 The institution dedicated to their preservation was profanely
used as a fortress to fight the invading Coalition forces, which endangered the
artifacts and underscored their subservience to Baathist political imperatives.
The invasion thus provided literal evidence of what the regime had
figuratively done over the years. The economic and cultural dissatisfaction
that motivated the looting of the museum and other historic sites outside of
Baghdad attested to the Baathist administration’s long-term failure to
prioritize cultural heritage preservation.
By contrast, the Iraq National Museum staff acted as if cultural
heritage was paramount. Dr. George and his staff placed the educational
value of artifacts at the forefront, and made considerable effort to protect them
for this potential in a post-war Iraq. By taking measures to protect the
antiquities, they had done one better than the U.S. and Iraqi forces. The
museum staff had moved many of the public galleries’ prized artifacts to a
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secret secure location ahead of time, and padded the items that were too large
to move. Dr. George provided weapons to his remaining staff to protect
themselves and the museum, and had stockpiled enough rations to stay at the
compound to defend it until the city was secured and proper order could be
restored.
The museum staff only abandoned the artifacts to preserve their
own lives. After seeing Republican Guard members scaling the wall and
making preparations for a battle at the site, “realizing the level of violence that
was imminent,” Dr. George and the final remaining staff members locked the
compound and fled.122 While they failed to protect the artifacts, their
dedication to this collection seems unimpeachable.
The citizen looters believed in the value of artifacts, but largely for
their economic potential. After all, groups of people simply do not loot
worthless items. Alienated from guardians of heritage, most Iraqi citizens that
chose to loot the museum of its contents upheld the monetary potential of the
artifacts as primary. As discussed previously, the opportunity to sell
antiquities that are likely to fetch a lucrative price on the black market likely
became an attractive means of either sustenance or income augmentation to a
portion of the population “well aware of their low rank on the economic
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scale” and where archaeology was considered “a convenient means to solve
such problems for poor Iraqis and their families.”123
It must not be ignored, however, that these stakeholder narratives
all aimed at self-preservation in a climate of intense competing interests. As
the invading force, the U.S. placed other civic ministries at the forefront to
justify its claim as a liberator, but suffered an embarrassing mishap when the
museum was looted. At this point, foreign stakeholders appropriated the
museum to preserve themselves. While Pentagon and White House officials
were privately angered and embarrassed by the disaster, they publicly
downplayed it, and opponents of the war used the incident as an opportunity
to denounce the invasion while supporters of the war used it as an opportunity
to justify the war effort.124 Indeed, many voiced their opposition to or support
for the war in the narrative of preserving human history.
Within Iraq, the Baathist regime chose to shore up its claim to
power prior to and during the war. Doing so left the museum in a regrettable
state of pre-invasion disarray, as both funds and manpower became diverted
elsewhere, and literally placed the institution in harm’s way during the
conflict. As further disaster loomed, the remaining museum staff became
ordinary private citizens and their primary goal then became securing their
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own lives and protecting their families. Ensuring the protection of antiquity
and keeping it above the fray was understandably relegated as secondary to
this more pressing aim.
The citizen looters also placed self-preservation at the forefront,
with the exception of the few who may have taken items to safeguard them
from destruction. This included both the ordinary citizens of Baghdad and the
professional thieves. In contrast to the museum officials, they valued either
seizing economic opportunity as their first priority or displaying frustration
against the outgoing regime. “Angry citizens destroyed what they saw as
government property in an act of protest, desperate opportunists stole what
they could in an impoverished time, and calculating thieves seized a chance to
steal some of the world’s most valued treasures.”125
What is apparent in examining these different approaches was how
such dire times of intense competing self-interest can lead to the widespread
looting of cultural heritage, as it did for the Iraq National Museum.
Additionally, the deleterious effect such a climate can ultimately have on not
only museums, but the ancient heritage that their collections preserve and
embody also becomes evident.
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II. The Debates Arising from the 2003 Looting of the Iraq National
Museum and the Inadequacy of Modern Cultural Heritage Protection
Laws

This second section will examine discussion that arose in the aftermath
o f the looting o f the Iraq National Museum in 2003. It will concentrate on the
first o f two major strands o f debate—whether U.S. failure to protect the
museum constituted a violation o f international law. This examination will
underscore several conundrums facing heritage protection and preservation,
illustrating how questions concerning potential U.S. violations o f
international law reveal the inadequacies o f modern legislation in protecting
cultural heritage.

Debate arising within the International Community
The actions of nations often serve as catalysts, spawning debates
over the meaning of those actions, and the looting of the Iraq National
Museum in 2003 has proved no exception. “State actions routinely trigger
transnational arguments about the meaning and application of international
norms,” and in the case of the 2003 looting of the Iraq National Museum, the
“the U.S. failure to secure the Iraq National Museum clearly catalyzed a
transnational argument about the obligation to protect cultural treasures.”
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Within this dialogue, a number of important questions arose.
Whether the United States had “an obligation to protect the greatest cultural
assets of the Iraqi people” and whether American policy “[provided] adequate
126 Sandholtz, Wayne. ‘The Iraqi National Museum and International Law: A Duty to
Protect.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Vol. 44 (2005), p. 188.
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guidance to ensure that the cultural property of the Iraqi people [would] be
preserved,”127 among other issues, were at the forefront of the discussion. A
consensus emerged that “cultural property is entitled to protection as a matter
of international human rights.”128 Despite this developing level of accord,
however, important political, moral, and legal questions still remained.
Amid the myriad perspectives offered in answer to these remaining
questions, two recurring themes in turn emerge. One is the debate over
whether the United States violated international law in failing to protect the
museum from looting ahead of time or to come to its aid when the looting
began. The other, examined in the next section, is whether approaches rooted
in cultural nationalism or internationalism are most appropriate in long-term
efforts to help to restore the museum.

The Evolution of International Law Protecting Cultural Property
A generous amount of international law addresses the protection of
cultural property during wartime. These international conventions may be
referenced, interpreted, and applied to United States’ actions in relation to the
Iraq National Museum in 2003. Prior to World War II and the widespread
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plundering of cultural property that came with it, some tenets existed. The
Lieber Code of 1863, for instance, forbade the pillaging or destruction of
public or private property during armed conflict, while the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 prohibited among its parties willful damage to
historic monuments and works of art and science.

129

Following World War I, the Roerich Pact of 1935 emerged in
response to the destruction of religious and educational institutions in France
and Belgium. The pact was a Pan-American agreement for the protection of
cultural property among the United States and twenty other countries in the
Western Hemisphere. While the Roerich Pact mirrored the Hague Convention
of 1907 in many ways, it afforded broader protections to historic, artistic,
scientific, and educational sites during conflict, giving them neutral status and
declaring that parties to the agreement had an obligation to “respect and
protect” such sites.130 Any specificity in what these tenets forbid, however, is
not reflected in the notion of penalties for infractions; rather, they stipulate
that violations “should be made the subject of legal proceedings.”131
Just as the cultural devastation of World War I led to the Roerich
Pact, the affronts to cultural property experienced during World War II led to
the Hague Convention of 1954. This convention stipulated that nations take

129 Sandholtz, pp. 206-209
130 Thurlow, pp. 158-159
131 Sandholtz, p. 209

53

measures to protect their own cultural sites in the event of war, invoking the
notion of a shared cultural heritage of all mankind. This tenet prohibited
invaders from attacking such sites and defenders from using them in ways that
attracted damage, as well as included the notion of individuals being held
accountable for violations under these tenets and subject to legal proceedings.
Parties to the convention were also charged with preventing damage to
cultural property by its own forces or the local citizens.132 The Hague
Convention would ultimately become the foremost piece of international law
in protecting cultural property and, not surprisingly, the main tenet referenced
in critiquing the United States’ actions in relation to the Iraq National
Museum.
At the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, the
Committee on Foreign Relations had not ratified the 1954 Hague Convention.
This decision was made not to immediately ratify it in order to preserve the
possibility for nuclear action against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
In the years since, most notably in 1972, with reduced nuclear threat, more
precise weaponry, and desire to prosecute crimes against cultural property, the
Department of Defense and Department of State reconsidered and
recommended ratification, though ratification did not occur until 2008.
Despite this inaction, the U.S. had not “objected to the provisions of the 1954
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Hague Convention,” and it had “repeatedly affirmed that [its] armed forces
comply with the treaty’s requirements both in military policy and in
practice.” 133
From this evolution of international conventions, one can observe a
progression in international norms to increasingly reaffirm and expand
protection for cultural property and relics of heritage—one onto which the
U.S. eventually formally signed. This “clear trend in international law has
been to reaffirm and expand protections for cultural property” in the “common
interest of international society in preserving historical, architectural, and
artistic treasures.”134 These provisions have provided for “protection from
intentional attack, incidental damage, pillage, and theft by state actors and
military forces of states who are parties to [them].”135
Notably, the 1954 Hague Convention and the Roerich Pact
represent the culmination of this progression in the protection of cultural
property. “The Roerich Pact read together with the Hague Convention seem
to present a united front of States, encompassing the entire globe ... [sharing]
a common burden of protecting their own and other States’ cultural property
to ensure the common benefit of posterity’s enjoyment and understanding of
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great works of history.”136 Not surprisingly, these international tenets mark
the main standard against which U.S. actions in Iraq have been judged, and
are widely referenced in the ensuing discussion over whether U.S. inaction
regarding protecting the museum amounted to a violation of international law.

The Debate over Whether the U.S. Violated International Law
Within this discussion, heritage professionals, government
officials, museum authorities, legal scholars, and others argued whether the
U.S. violated international law by failing to protect the museum from looting.
Both sides of this particular debate enjoy a considerable degree of
representation within this body of literature. Although opinions varied, more
discussants argued that the U.S. did indeed violate international law. This
reading of literature in this arena shows that the belief that the U.S. violated
international law is often been based on an interpretation of the intent behind
such tenets and the spirit of national unification with international norms,
while the belief that the U.S. did not violate international law, on the other
hand, is most often been based on a strict and literal reading of the laws in
question.
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Arguments supporting the Belief that the U.S. Violated International Law
Many legal scholars deem the U.S. failure to protect the museum
to indeed amount to a violation of international law. This belief, more often
than not, has been supported with readings of the intent behind the relevant
tenets and the spirit of national harmony with international standards. Several
lines of thought appear in the body of literature supporting this. Based on a
high-level reading of standards of international law such as the Hague
Conventions and the Roerich Pact, support encompasses responsibilities
incurred as the occupier of a country and has equated crimes against culture
with crimes against humanity.
Given the trend in international norms to progressively reaffirm
and expand protection for cultural property, scholarly literature and
jurisprudence has been unsurprisingly critical of U.S. actions. Indeed,
“international reactions ranged from critical to scathing” and “reactions within
American society were just as vehement,”137 according to Dr. Wayne
Sandholtz, a Professor of Political Science whose work focuses on
international norms and institutions. Other authorities, such as the Muslim
Association of Britain, likened the Coalition occupation of Iraq to the Mongol
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invasion of 1258 in terms of “cultural and historical vandalism.”138 A highlevel reading of the Roerich Pact and the Hague Convention, along with other
related international tenets, reveal their purpose to indisputably be the
safeguarding of relics of cultural heritage during periods of violent strife.
Given this high-level reading and public officials’ orders to conduct
themselves in accordance with such standards, despite not formally being a
party to all of them at the time of the invasion, the U.S. may have implicitly
recognized a reasonable expectation of protection for the museum.
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many have noted, “though the United States is not a party to the Hague
Convention for Protection of Cultural Property, it is a signatory and is thus at
least nominally tied to both treaties.”140 Thus, the U.S. plausibly was under
international obligation to provide some degree of security to the museum.
In a similar vein, the literature argues that the looting was
avoidable. Chief among both journalists’ and scholars’ accusations were that
U.S. war planners should have been able to anticipate the looting of the
museum given past experiences in the First Gulf War and explicit warnings of
the likelihood of looting by Middle East scholars and heritage preservation
experts prior to and during the war. The “disparities between official
reassurances and the realities on the ground” that legendary British
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archaeologist and soldier Mortimer Wheeler saw in both World Wars I and II
were tragically still being made in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.141 U.S.
authorities failed to heed these explicit warnings, appearing simply to not pay
attention. The “United States’ accountability will” then “be dependent on
whether or not its failure to prevent the organized and sustained looting of the
museum can be considered destruction or ‘willful damage’.” 142
The key lesson learned from the museum’s looting in 2003 is that
negligence is often conflated with purposeful destruction. For many, if the
looting was a foreseeable outcome, then U.S. inaction was the same as
action.143 Whether it was an error of omission or commission, however, the
two often amount to the same thing for those that suffer as a result. Though it
is more likely true that U.S. officials were reluctant, rather than incapable, to
foresee the pillaging, it mattered little. Even if the necessary information had
not made it to the decision makers, there is no difference in culpability.
Ultimately, U.S. officials’ inability or unwillingness to anticipate the looting,
their slowness to stop the looting when the second widespread wave of theft
had begun, and its sluggishness in securing the museum compound once the
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looting had ceased are themselves akin to actually participating in the theft
themselves.
Going beyond the minimal responsibility, then, has revealed itself
to be necessary in ensuring the protection of cultural heritage during times of
strife. Contrasting U.S. action relative to the “the swift securing of the Oil
Ministry” 144 in Baghdad and the nation’s oil fields outside of it is a useful
illustration. Though this was arguably unnecessary under minimal
responsibilities, doing so had the potential to help secure Iraq’s economy in
the future, so the U.S. exceeded minimal responsibilities and secured these
resources. The same could easily have been achieved for the museum, and
failing to anticipate or recognize a duty to do so betrays a unilateral or
isolationist mindset.
Additionally, the U.S. incurred responsibilities as an occupier in
Iraq. The 1907 Hague Convention affirmed that “territory [was] considered
occupied when it [was] actually placed under the authority of the hostile
army” and the occupation extends .... where such authority has been
established and can be exercised.”145 According to this, there was a strong
argument that the U.S. was essentially an occupying power in Iraq “with

144 Sandholtz, p. 237
145 Paust, Jordan J. “The U.S. as Occupying Power Over Portions of Iraq and Relevant
Responsibilities Under the Laws of War.” The American Society of International Law
Insights. Vol. 1 (2003), p. 2.

60

competencies and responsibilities under the laws of war.”146 A study just two
months prior to the invasion by the U.S. Army War College reaffirmed this,
stating that “occupiers assume responsibility for historic and cultural sites.” 147
The United States, therefore, had responsibilities to protect the museum. As
such, national officials, such as high-level commanders, were potentially
responsible for the 2003 looting. Low-level leaders, such as “a sergeant or a
company commander on a combat mission in an Iraqi town, while hostilities
are generally ongoing in that sector, cannot not easily shift from a combat role
to the role of police officer .... But those much higher up in the chain of
command, who see the larger picture and who can assign various missions to
soldiers, have a responsibility to deploy troops to engage in law and order
roles in sectors that come under control of U.S. military forces to the extent
that such areas generally come under effective U.S. control and occupation
1 AO

law and order competencies can be exercised.”
A third line of thought supporting U.S. culpability rests on the
sentiment that crimes against culture are analogous to crimes against
humanity.149 The study of material culture depends entirely on items
embodying a deeper set of meaning for individuals or groups. In the case of
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cultural property, it “carries significance far beyond the value of the object
and appeals to a sector of the world’s population far beyond any individual
owner.”150 Later in 2003, the Iraqi Special Tribunal that was put in place to
govern criminalized “other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health.”151 It follows, then, that crimes against cultural heritage could
potentially be viewed as grievous as crimes against humanity.
If cultural treasures could be viewed as infrastructure connecting
diverse people with a shared heritage, then the act of “analogizing cultural
treasures to physical infrastructure is quite instructive. The historic and
artistic treasures of a country are its cultural infrastructure. They are palpable
pieces of its heritage, traditions, and identity, connecting its people one to
another.”152 If the United States’ aim was to liberate a nation and stamp out a
history of crimes against humanity, it would, by the same token, be bound to
eradicate crimes against cultural property and the remnants of cultural heritage
as well.
Bolstering this jurisprudential belief that the U.S. violated
international law is the opinion of the Iraqi people. The narrative of who is to
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blame persists throughout the coverage of much of A1 Jazeera’s coverage,
with US idleness or negligence being the predominate culprit. For instance,
coverage claimed that the small size of the U.S. force near the museum and
the tank round shot into it was their way of inviting the looting to exact
1
revenge on the Baathists. *

Arguments against a U.S. Violation of International Law
Despite the depth and strength of this case, some legal scholars
argued that U.S. actions did not amount to a violation of international law.
These contentions rested on a literal reading of international conventions and
the obligations under them.
There was a litany of justifications that officials cited as reasons
the U.S. had no obligation to secure or protect the museum. Chief among
them was the conviction that the U.S. presence in Iraq was not an occupation,
but rather a liberation, as evidenced by it having never been proclaimed to be
an occupation, as well as the fact that conflict was ongoing. These
justifications, however, were only tenuously defended. Ultimately, wrote
Jordan Paust, who is among the most cited of American law professors and
has served on a number of committees regarding international law, human
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rights, laws of war, terrorism, and the use of force, “regardless of the purpose
of the overall mission, the lack of formal admission, and the fact that some
fighting [was] still taking place, the United States [was] an occupying power
with competencies and responsibilities under the laws of war ... in each
portion of Iraqi territory that [fell] within effective control of its military.”154
Other defenders of U.S. policy argued that combating the civilian
looting was a secondary concern to militarily controlling the Baathist
stronghold of Baghdad, as well as that U.S. officials did not foresee that Iraqis
would loot their own heritage in the first place.155 The latter seems unlikely,
given that weeks before the invasion commenced, the Archaeological Institute
of America published an “Open Declaration on Cultural Heritage at Risk in
Iraq” that was signed by thirteen organizations and more than two hundred
individuals around the world; the president of the American Association of
Museum Art Directors published an opinion-editorial piece in the Washington
Post on the matter; and the president of the American Council for Cultural
Property expressed concerns in writing to prominent war planners, including
the Defense Secretary, National Security Advisor, and Secretary of State.

1

Put simply, “if the goal of the United States in invading Iraq was actually to
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bring democracy and freedom, protecting cultural institutions would have
been a meaningful show of goodwill.”157
Additionally, domestic U.S. antiquity laws—such as the Cultural
Property Act and the National Stolen Property Act—prohibited and prevented
the illicit import, export, or transfer of cultural property, and thus offered little
assistance to prevent looting.158 For instance, there remained some debate as
to whether the U.S. was formally bound by the 1954 Hague Convention. As
previously discussed, the U.S. had not signed the convention and was thus not
a party to the 1954 Hague Convention at the time of the invasion of Iraq in
2003. Given, however, that the U.S. did claimed to “follow its principles as a
matter of customary international law,” it does seem appropriate for one to
“consider the United States ... as bound by the provisions of the 1954
Convention,” 159 but a literal reading of the law would not necessarily ensure
this.
Aside from literal readings claiming that international conventions
were inapplicable, others argued that the U.S. adhered to relevant laws. Some
pointed out that there still remained some confusion as to what U.S. forces
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were specifically charged to do, even if the United States was indeed bound
by the 1954 Hague Convention. Second, U.S. defenders claimed that
invading forces closely adhered to legal obligations during conflict by not
actively engaging in the looting, nor causing willful damage to sites of historic
significance, and avoiding risky appropriation of such sites without military
necessity.160 To this end, the Iraq National Museum, along with numerous
other museums and archaeological sites were added to the no-strike list and
1 /r i

escaped direct damage from the Coalition bombardment.
Additionally, the convention only required the prevention of statesponsored looting, not civilian looting as was seen in Iraq in 2003. While few
are unconvinced of the responsibility to maintain public order and safety,
there were some who questioned “whether preventing this type of looting is a
tenet of maintaining public order.”162 The wording of the convention also
only required occupying forces to assist the national authorities in
safeguarding artifacts, not to actually assume this responsibility themselves.
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These claims ignore that, under some conditions, this may be near impossible
for national authorities to accomplish, or the possibility that there might be no
national authorities left in place to do so.
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The Inadequacies of Legislation in Protecting Cultural Heritage
Overall, the productiveness of this debate was limited. The events
had already occurred and the majority of recoverable artifacts had been
reclaimed. No formal charges against the U.S. have yet been levied, nor are
there likely to be. More debate will not likely return more artifacts or repair
the museum. This debate has effectively highlighted shortcomings in
international conventions that address these situations.
To protect remnants of cultural heritage and property, international
law on its own is patently inadequate as a means of deterrence. Such
conventions are ultimately ineffectual without being backed by a legitimate
national conviction to fulfill their intended purpose. Generally, significant
loopholes in relevant international tenets include clarity of responsibility,
being a party to the conventions, reliance upon burdened nations, the notion of
military necessity, and being unclear in focus. These holes can, and did in the
case of the museum, amount to a failure in international protections for
protecting museums during wartime.164
For instance, one gap in international conventions concerns clarity
of the responsibilities that ensue after an initial invasion. Obligations in
stability operations remained less apparent. While the “requirement to assist
‘competent national authorities’ in ‘safeguarding and preserving [their]
164 Petersen, pp. 179-187
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cultural property’ during periods of occupation” may be “relatively well
settled,” questions remain, such as not only “what is the extent of assistance to
‘competent national authorities’ that is required by international law?” but
also “when does ‘occupation’ begin?”165 In the case of the U.S. invasion of
Iraq, “there is still considerable controversy to this day about when U.S.
forces established effective control over the area of Baghdad near the
museum, which would trigger the protection of an occupying force.”
Additionally, even if “the legal obligations of cultural property protection in
armed conflict have been scrupulously adhered to, the legal obligations to
provide such protection in stability operations have been less clear,”

1A7

thus

opening the door for a failure to occur.
Another large loophole in international law governing cultural
heritage protection concerns parties to the international conventions and the
responsibilities that ensue. Unfortunately, “the line between national and
individual responsibility for the destruction of cultural property is tenuous.”

1AS

When individuals commit such offenses, there is no guarantee that his or her
nation will pursue prosecution. When nations commit such offenses, by the
same token, the global community lacks an undisputed “formal and consistent
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prosecutorial or adjudicative body” capable of leading the way in terms of
enforcement.
This lack of clarity regarding responsibility extends to nations as
well. There are significant points of failure in international conventions such
as the 1954 Hague Convention and the Roerich Pact relating to the
safeguarding of cultural property. There are gaps concerning exactly when
these tenets are applicable, what must be done under them, and what the
penalties are for failure to comply with them. “The international conventions
designed to protect cultural property fall short of mandating protection for all
possible situations.”169 The contestation over whether the U.S. was bound by
these tenets is evidence enough of this deficiency, and the same is true of the
contestation over what the U.S. was bound to do under these conventions and
who, if anyone, may be formally held accountable. The question then arises,
what to do when nations are not formally bound by the conventions and tenets
in place governing cultural property?
Indeed, the current “standards of cultural property protection
remain vague and open to multiple and competing understandings and invite
parties to re-construe treaty obligations in ways that are politically or

169 Paroff, Sasha P. “Another Victim of the War in Iraq: The Looting of the National
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militarily expedient.”170 Given this inadequacy, cultural tragedies of large
proportion such as the 2003 looting of the Iraq National Museum are bound to
occur. The 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocols “can have little efficacy
when it is not accepted by many countries throughout the world.”171 That the
U.S. had not ratified it at the time of the Iraq invasion, and did not until 2008,
reveals the tenet’s limited effectiveness. While not having ratified it for so
long indicates a unilateral spirit out of touch with the international
community, it does not make it any less difficult to make nations culpable for
violating treaties to which they are not formally a party.
Additionally, the convention “relies too much on the countries
involved to protect their own cultural property.”172 In order to accomplish
this, nations must prioritize other preparations over artifacts ahead of conflict
and leave less-equipped agents to fill in, while the international legal
community often “offers little effective assistance.”173 This can amount to an
undue burden for many nations when preparing to face widespread armed
conflict. In 2003, Iraq was charged with protecting its own artifacts leading
up to the conflict. As noted previously, the remaining museum staff did a
remarkable job making what preparations they could—removing some items
for safekeeping elsewhere, securing larger immovable items to better weather
170 Thurlow, p. 182
171 Petersen, p. 179
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173 Petersen, pp. 184-185

70

the Coalition bombing campaign, as well as arming and supplying themselves
to protect the museum complex for a sustained period of time. They were,
however, very quickly forced to flee the conflict and there was no formal Iraqi
government left to protect the museum complex once the looting began.174
The confluence of non-existent Iraqi forces and unwilling U.S. agents
ultimately paved the way for the tragic looting of thousands of years of
cultural heritage to occur.
The notion of “military necessity” also creates a dangerous hole in
international conventions concerning the safeguarding of cultural heritage.
Military necessity, in this context, allows forces to waive their obligations to
refrain from actively exposing culturally significant sites when necessary. It
holds that damage to culturally significant sites is excused when the warring
parties had no other choice. Such an “exception for protection of cultural
artifacts,” however, “further weakens the protections granted by the
convention,” and many describe it as a “convenient fiction.”175 As is often the
case, the definition of what exactly constitutes military necessity was unclear.
Legislation often grants discretionary power and creates an out for warring
parties when it is “militarily inconvenient” to provide protection or convenient
to destroy. An exception for military necessity effectively advertises the
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secondary status of cultural heritage protection to a nation’s military conquest
in times of armed conflict.
Additionally, an imprudent focus can also be perceived in
international conventions. Notably, there has been a “shift in international
law from conceptualizations of cultural property as private property or the
property of a nation-state to property of the international community and
‘individual peoples’.”

17 A

The Geneva Protocols and the Hague Convention,

for instance, re-conceptualize cultural property as belonging to certain
peoples, as opposed to nations or the world, because “national interests are
divergent” and thus cannot be trusted to consistently protect the cultural
property of all subgroups.177 Taking this into account, U.S. policy did not
succeed, at least partially, because it afforded protections to cultural property
that were barely more stringent than those afforded regular private property.178
Implicit in this malfunction is the failure to recognize that cultural property
has vast importance over that of customary private property. This distinction
between regular private property and cultural property cannot be overstated;
the intrinsic higher value ascribed to cultural property underlies the entire
international protocol for its protection during times of conflict.
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The tendency of international tenets having a reactive rather than a
proactive focus is also problematic. There are still “limitations on the
international community’s ability to prevent and prosecute acts against
cultural property in times of war.”179 Tenets such as the 1954 Hague
Convention and later UNESCO conventions “focus too heavily on repatriation
and the recovery of items” having cultural significance that are looted or
damaged in armed conflict, when “the focus should be on the prevention of
looting” in the first place.180
While it is laudable that such conventions require an occupying
force to prevent the export of artifacts abroad and to return all artifacts found
when the conflict ends, unfortunately, the damage has most often already been
done during this process. Focusing on repatriation ignores “the number of
artifacts that will be destroyed in the actual looting, let alone the destruction of
the museum building and its fixtures.”181 Furthermore, there are no
guarantees that these looted artifacts may ever be found in recovery efforts.
“When professional art thieves with great knowledge of the black market are
involved,” as was the case with two of the three waves of looting in 2003 Iraq,
“there is even less chance that pieces will be recovered.”182 Indeed, many
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museums that have been looted are still missing pieces decades after
repatriation efforts began, and the Iraq National Museum no exception.

The Necessity of Firm National Support in Cultural Heritage Protection
Apart from underscoring the delicate balance within which cultural
heritage protection exists, an international discussion is less important than
resolution, whether the context is meaningful laws or meaningful
enforcement. If the U.S. did not violate international law, then the
effectiveness of heritage protection laws is significantly diminished. If the
U.S. violated these laws, then these tenets have failed on the grounds of
enforceability. Surely some governing body can enforce these rules during
wartime, but the failure for this to have occurred in the wake of the 2003
looting of the Iraq National Museum speaks to a deficiency of enforcement.
What we have learned in the wake of the looting is that protective laws are
useful, though they must accompany legitimate national commitment in order
to succeed.
The argument that U.S. actions did not violate international law
demonstrates the limitations of international conventions and tenets alone.
After all, recent operations in Iraq have “demonstrated the failure of the legal
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mechanisms in ensuring such protection”183 and shown how “international
safeguards for cultural property have been ineffective in protecting
museums.”184 As the 2003 looting of the Iraq National Museum illustrates,
“international attempts to protect cultural property have not immunized
museums from looting and destruction. Just as the lives of an invaded people
remain at risk during international conflict, so too are the artistic creations and
archaeological remnants of those people likely to become the victims of that
conflict.”185
International law is not enough to ensure protection of cultural
property. Legal mechanisms offer insufficient protection for humanitarian
concerns, including the preservation and protection of relics of cultural
heritage. That cultural heritage continues to suffer during armed conflict,
even as relevant conventions, pacts, and treaties have been in place for some
time, provides evidence for this. That is not to say that international law
governing the protection of remnants of cultural heritage should be ignored or
abolished; rather, it highlights the bitter reality at play that “the law is
necessary, but not sufficient, to protect humanitarian concerns in armed
conflict.”186
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Put simply, international conventions aimed at preserving cultural
heritage can do little until nations actually wish to do so. International
conventions like the Hague Conventions of 1899, 1907, and 1954, as well as
the 1977 Geneva Protocol I are indeed honorable examples of legislation. The
“provisions of the conventions should not bear all of the blame,” but rather,
“nations must share the blame for nonparticipation and noncompliance.”187
“International laws, in whatever form and with whatever provisions, will only
be effective in protecting the cultural property of the world when the great
nations of the world decide that such property is worth protecting and act
upon that decision.”188 Only then will the necessary lasting commitments in
the form of both fiscal and human resources result.
This would mark a significant change of direction for the United
States. It would represent an alignment of U.S. norms with those of the
international community. One way to accomplish this would be to exceed
treaty obligations, which would be especially useful, given the “vagueness and
ineffectiveness of international cultural property treaties.”189 One of the most
apparent means of observing this is the “sharp distinction between
intentionally looting and destroying sites of cultural significance and the far
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broader duty to protect cultural property.”190 While U.S. actions may have
fulfilled the former responsibility, they certainly fell short of the latter. The
sentiment expressed by those advocating for a minimal fulfillment of
responsibility that “the United States could have done much more to protect
the museum” but, regrettably, “did all that was required under international
laws of war” 191 must not be forgotten as this evolution of national doctrine
occurs. Cultural heritage protection should then be a “key focal point in
stability operations and counter-insurgency ... even if such protection is not
required as a matter of law.”192
Such a spirit of fulfilling minimal obligations has contributes
significantly to the notion of American callousness that hampers the nation’s
international reputation and its progress in nation building abroad. From the
events of April 2003, the United States learned that “intentionally destroying
cultural sites is often conflated with negligently failing to prevent their
destruction” and that in “real terms, it does not matter who destroys cultural
property, it only matters that it is lost.”193 While a minimalist commitment to
compliance may “[prevent] some destruction of cultural property,” it “[fails]
to speak to the larger values behind these rules.”194 If the international tenets
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in place cannot fully ensure the fulfillment of this broader duty to protect, then
exceeding these minimal responsibilities is the surest path forward. The U.S.
must then, in the future, move beyond traditional obligations and pursue more
active measures that “represent larger international and national ideals” in
order to prevent the plunder of the remnants of cultural heritage.195
The United States has already made progress in this endeavor since
the terrible events of 2003. One need only compare the nation’s initial
invasion strategy to its more recent counter-insurgency strategy. U.S. policy
makers and war planners began by spending most of their time and energy on
the least demanding task—defeating Saddam’s weakened conventional
forces—and the least amount on the most demanding—rehabilitation of and
security for the new Iraq.” Hindsight has indeed shown that aside from the
initial justification for the war proving false, “the most glaring error was the
failure to plan for stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction.”196
Since 2003, however, armed forces have incorporated principles of
cultural heritage protection into their counter-insurgency manuals. After all,
“if the center of gravity of the counter-insurgency (COIN) fight is the people,
then their cultural heritage is the conscience of the people ... and a visible
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symbol of their society.”197 Now the U.S. COIN Manual emphasizes cultural
awareness, training for soldiers in this arena, as “respect for cultural norms
and objects has ... become an integral part of both counterinsurgency and
stability operations.”198 While this was not the case in 2003, it has been noted
that “stability operations can only be successfully accomplished with
integrated civilian and military efforts.”199 The museum is an integral part of
this, as this essay will subsequently discuss in greater detail.
Another path forward is to revise a more modern national policy
regarding cultural property. At the time of the looting of the Iraq Museum,
the official U.S. policy was in harmony with international conventions nearly
one hundred years old. Such reliance upon outdated conventions not only
leads to tragedies such as the 2003 looting, but it also “fails to recognize
evolving understandings of culture and cultural ownership.”200
Additionally, “the world’s only superpower [remaining] a nonparty to [the 1954 Hague Convention]” despite “the jurisprudence of
international tribunals and the assessments of international law scholars
[converging] on the conclusion that the key norms embodied in the [treaty] ...
have achieved customary international law status”201 was notable. While the
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U.S. had not formally objected to or criticized any of the treaty’s provisions, it
nonetheless had not signed it. This underscored years of the U.S. having been
unaligned with the international community.
The U.S. Senate ratified the 1954 Hague Convention in 2008,
which partially aligned the nation with the international community. This
outcome was undoubtedly influenced by the 2003 looting and the international
community’s subsequent condemnation. Ratifying the 1954 Hague
Convention was meaningful in that it not only clarifies, but also reinforces the
responsibility assumed by the U.S. to protect cultural property during periods
of armed conflict.
Realigning its policies with widely accepted international norms,
however, is not enough. As many practitioners and scholars of international
law have noted, the mere “ratification of international treaties will not be
enough to save the world’s cultural property from destruction.”202 Rather, the
United States must go one step further, adhering to both the word and the
broader intent of these conventions and working to reform these tenets in
order to continually become more substantive and effective as time
progresses. The United States’ doctrine relating to cultural property during
wartime will certainly continue to evolve. Cultural property laws must be
“explicit, rather than implicitly derived” from a series of other general
202 Thurlow, p. 185
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provisions, but too little progress has yet been made to this end.203 As
“doctrine assigning responsibility for protection of cultural property in
stability operations is still evolving,”204 the United States must play a leading
role in this evolution to ensure its success. Only then might tragedies such as
the looting cease.
U.S. officials must not assume that the nation has little interest in
complying with international norms. Indeed, the opposite is true. “If the
United States offends international sentiment by neglecting to respect national
cultural property, it can expect an adverse impact on its diplomacy and global
perception generally.”205 Military victors “are already sufficiently reviled by
those whom they have conquered without aiding—whether through action or
inaction—the destruction of a conquered country’s culture.”

Protecting

cultural heritage, then, can be a gesture of goodwill that may lend an air of
legitimacy to such interventions.
If the United States’ “concern for cultural property is exclusively
reserved for that of the Americas, then its concern runs counter to the purpose
o f ’ international tenets.207 It also runs counter to U.S. national ideals. “The
United States’ interest in the preservation of international cultural property

203 Ralby, p. 188
204 Jackson, p. 54
205 Campbell, p. 425
206 Petersen, p. 191
207 Campbell, p. 431

81

should be strengthened in recognition of American diversity and the
possibility, therefore, that many Americans may be tied to cultural property
located outside the Americas.”208 In this light, aligning the nation’s norms
with the standards of the international community is indeed simultaneously in
the best interests of the United States.
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III. Nationalism or Internationalism? The Conundrum Facing Cultural
Heritage Protection Today

The previous section examined discussion that arose in the aftermath
o f the 2003 looting o f the Iraq National Museum, with a focus on one o f two
main strands o f debate—whether the U.S. violated international law by failing
to prevent or halt the looting. This section will focus on the second strand o f
debate—whether a theory o f cultural nationalism or internationalism is most
appropriate in repairing the museum.
This section weighs the merits o f museum reconstruction strategies
rooted in both cultural nationalism or and internationalism. It will examine
the pros and cons o f each alternative and show that, despite each school o f
thought enjoying a considerable degree o f support, the prevailing trend in
modern years has been to lean toward more international approaches. It will
also demonstrate how debate over the merits o f culturally national or
international reconstruction strategies reveal a bitter tradeoff between acting
in the best interest o f the global community or that o f the recovering Iraqi
nation.

The Second Strand of Debate within the International Community
As previously discussed, the 2003 looting of the Iraq National
Museum generated considerable debate. From the dialogue emerged a
consensus upholding the importance of protecting cultural heritage in times of
strife or conflict. Still, important political, legal, and moral questions
remained. Two recurring themes emerged: the first concerns whether the
United States violated international law in failing to afford protection to the
museum complex. The second addressed whether cultural nationalist or
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internationalist approaches more appropriately should shape efforts to help to
restore the museum.

Cultural Nationalism vs. Cultural Internationalism
Two principal schools of thought relating to material culture and
preservation are cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism. Today the
Iraq National Museum is open, though far from fully functional. Only about
half of its galleries are accessible to the public.209 A number of well-known
items have been recovered and others continue to be returned, such as a statue
of the Sumerian King Entemena recovered in 2010.210 All but 254 of the
2,703 estimated to have been taken from the first and second floors have been
recovered.211 A renovation of the Islamic and Assyrian halls was completed
with a donation and technical and assistance from Italy, though the strength of
the museum’s security remains to be determined.212 Some former members of
the staff disappeared after the war,213 but those that remain continues its
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mission, though a lack of funding hinders its efforts to preserve artifacts
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and improper cataloguing may persist.215 While these gains have been
encouraging, much progress remains, and further plans are not concrete.
Amid this, there is “heated debate over how Iraq’s heritage should be
managed.”216
By way of classification, cultural nationalism tends to
“[emphasize] the national origin of the cultural objects, with the goal of
retaining all objects in their home country.”217 This gives nations “a special
interest, implies the attribution of national characters to objects, independently
of their location or ownership, and legitimizes national export controls and
demands for the ‘repatriation’ of cultural property.”218 Implicit in cultural
nationalism is the belief that source nations must be able to control the
historical narratives that artifact aid in communicating, and some groups may
choose to place value on the reworking, recycling, or omission of such
narratives.219 One basic justification is the ease of policing buyers of
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antiquities than protecting all objects of cultural value.220 More fundamental
motivations behind cultural nationalism stem from the belief that there “is an
offense” to the country of origin if the objects reside in any other country.

221

Retaining such objects, in this view, supports the cultural growth and
understanding of the source nation’s people and lures both sustained research
and tourism to the source nation. On both the educational and economic
222

levels, a “nation stays alive when its culture stays alive.”"

Keeping objects

in their source country enables that country to thrive commercially and
culturally.
Cultural internationalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the
common culture of mankind over the particular experience of any source
nation alone.223 Not surprisingly, such views undergird arguments against
adopting culturally nationalistic legislation. The theory of cultural
internationalism focuses on the proposition that “‘cultural property belonging
to any people whatsoever’ is ‘the cultural heritage of all mankind’” and, under
this, “everyone has an interest in the preservation and enjoyment of all
cultural property, wherever it is situated, from whatever cultural or geographic
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source.”224 The interest in protecting and preserving the objects are, therefore,
placed above the interest of the nation of origin in retaining the object. The
key players that promulgate such views are wealthier, often Western, nations
and those who oppose the political element of cultural nationalism, feeling
that uncontrolled nationalism “may distract from the cultural and historical
importance of the objects.”225
Preservation of artifacts is a major concern for cultural
internationalism. The theory aims to balance “the integrity of artifacts, or the
need to have all pieces of particular artifacts together, to enhance their
cultural, aesthetic, and educational values” with the bitter reality that often,
“source nations do not have the resources to fully preserve the objects for
future study and exhibition.”

Additionally, “an appropriate international

distribution” of artifacts “of the common cultural heritage” can avoid
“destructive retention,” “covetous neglect,” or the hoarding of artifacts in
source nations that lack the proper resources,227 while simultaneously
facilitating the world’s cultures to both be exposed to and understand their
own artistic, scientific, and civic achievements, as well as those of others, as
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“all of mankind has a reasonable opportunity for access to its own and other
people’s cultural achievements.”228
Each approach has strengths and limits. Cultural nationalism can
often be best for the source country. This is largely due to realizing the
economic benefit of tourism economics, fostering a national identity,
providing a beneficial social education for citizenry, and preserving a
sustainable future of domestic scholarship. Cultural internationalism, on the
other hand, frequently safeguards the artifacts themselves and heritage
preservation as a field of study. Internationalism often serves the artifacts
when source nations are relatively poor and when the global community can
enjoy more widespread access to the artifacts, thus fostering a broad sense of
common heritage.

Cultural Nationalism or Internationalism in Recovery Strategies for the
Iraq National Museum
Whether strategies based in cultural nationalism and cultural
internationalism are more appropriate for recovery efforts for the Iraq
National Museum has been frequently debated. There have been a number of
heritage professionals who support each option, as well as some who advocate
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for a mix of the two. Recently, debate has favored cultural internationalism.
Not surprisingly, in keeping with the current trend, the literature on the Iraq
museum to date overwhelmingly supports cultural internationalism.

Arguments supporting Cultural Nationalism in the Museumfs Recovery
The main avenue of support for strategies rooted in cultural
nationalism for the recovery of the Iraq National Museum is the belief that
autonomous nations should be able to do as they wish with the remnants of
their own cultural heritage. From a Rawlsian ethics approach, few countries
would want to sacrifice such control. Additionally, with regard to the
recovering Iraqi nation, the ability to retain its cultural property could “instill
a notion of common heritage in the Iraqi people,” as well as “greatly uplift the
spirits of the Iraqi people and aid them in forming a greater sense of national
unity.”229 In fact, a letter to the President of the United States from all major
American archaeological and heritage organizations hinted at this, noting that
the “return to freedom of the Iraqi people must include the freedom to enjoy
the great heritage resources inherited from their ancestors.”
From this degree of control of one’s own cultural heritage stems
the belief that culturally nationalistic legislative schemes can foster a
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connection with this past and thus a greater degree of unity in the present.
Since cultural nationalism “encourages a national interest in the history and
culture of the nation and, therefore, increases a people’s pride in their nation,”
many believe that pursuing a recovery strategy rooted in cultural nationalism
for the Iraq National Museum would benefit the Iraqi populace during this
“state of upheaval and new beginnings.”231
An additional strain of underlying logic is that “retaining the
nation’s cultural objects ... supports the cultural growth and understanding of
the nation’s people” due to “the value inherent in the possession of the
antiquities” to “lure archaeologists, scientists, and historians in the nation and
from abroad.”232 There is also financial benefit that may be realized from the
development of cultural heritage tourism in source nations that merits
mention.233 Cultural tourism has been an incredibly lucrative industry in a
number of countries—e.g., Egypt, Italy, France, and Greece—with their
economies benefiting from a “constant flow of tourists flocking to see ...
historical achievements in monuments, ancient ruins, and museums.”234 This
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positive economic impact has also been recognized by Britain’s Department
for International Development.235
Looking to history, this surely can be witnessed in the case of Iraq.
For years, Iraq’s sense of national identity has indeed been shaped by its
cultural heritage. This trajectory can be traced back to British archaeologist
Gertrude Bell, the wealthy Englishwoman who developed an appreciation for
Mesopotamian while studying at Oxford and traveled extensively through the
Middle East, surveying a number of the region’s archaeological sites. Bell
served in a number of British offices in the region both during and after World
War I, was instrumental in establishing the pro-British Faisal monarchy, and
eventually established what would become the Iraq National Museum.236 The
“sense of Iraqi nationalism that had guided [Bell’s] politics transferred into
her archaeological work,” as her legacy began with an interest in archaeology
but ultimately “became the achievement of unity for a people who live in
separate factions.”237 Although she may not have been “the instigator of
nationalist ideas in the country, for they were already emerging before WWII,
[Bell] gave the people of Iraq control over their antiquities and therefore
control over their past,” which “gave the Iraqis a sense of national identity,
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embodied in the museum she set up,” which proved to be “an essential
component for [the] new country to be successful.”238
Prior to the war with the United States, Iraq’s previous legislation
was also nationalistic in nature. The Antiquities Law of 1936, for example,
declared all antiquities—defined as “movable and immovable possessions
which were erected, made, produced, sculptured, written, drawn or
photographed by man, if they are two hundred years old or more”—to be state
property, prohibited their removal or damage by citizens, charged citizens
with reporting such violations, and forbade excavation without state
approval.239
Contemporary observers believe that adopting this previous
legislation would encourage a greater popular interest in Iraqi history and
culture. Aside from the substantial economic benefit from future cultural
heritage tourism in the future, communicating the importance of this common
heritage could lead to a larger measure of unity within the new Iraq, with the
artifacts themselves helping to unite Iraqis.
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Arguments supporting the Museum’s Recovery via Cultural
Internationalism
The main avenue of support for strategies rooted in cultural
nationalism for the recovery of the Iraq National Museum is the belief in a
shared global history that must be preserved for future generations. Since it
“could be argued th a t... Iraq’s heritage is essential to the common history of
humankind,” many believe that “Iraq could gain the support of many peoples
by exposing them to Iraq’s artifacts and history” and that the nation would
thus “benefit greatly from the distribution of its artifacts, as [this] would allow
other cultures and nations the opportunity to study and appreciate the Iraqi
cultural heritage.”240
“Cultural heritage is im portant... Not for any specific nationalistic
agenda but for the explicit agenda of making the world a better, safer, more
harmonious, and more civilised [sic] place to live.”241 As a result, the belief
that the remnants of a cultural heritage must be shielded from nationalistic
agendas that distort the narrative of history is more than common. Nationalist
approaches are common in nations “newly formed as the result of the
dissolution of empires.”242 Since modern-day Iraq would certainly be
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classified as.one such nation, it is thus imperative to be aware of the peril that
nationalism can pose to cultural heritage.
According to a number of scholars of cultural heritage, the
culturally nationalistic stance is a political instrument. “Politics bedevils
archaeology, and has for more than a century,” and the “sad truth is that
nationalist cultural-property laws are not intended to protect the world’s
ancient heritage,” but instead “are meant to claim that heritage as the property
of the modem nation-state, important to its identity and esteem.”243 If
nationalistic cultural property laws do not protect the heritage, but rather claim
it as a country’s property to “legitimize modern governments’ claims as heirs
to an ancient past,” it is imperative to note that this “[distorts] the truth of
culture,” by “[imposing] nationalist characteristics on antiquity when none
could possible exist,” making it appear that culture is static and pure when, in
reality, it is “fluid and mongrel.”244
While it may be argued that nationalistic agendas may have made
the Iraq National Museum one of the most valuable in the world, the perils of
cultural nationalism can be seen today. Iraq’s new government has since
reassigned the Iraq National Museum from being housed under the
nonpolitical State Board of Antiquities and Heritage to now be located not

243 Cuno, p. B9
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within the Ministry of Culture, but rather within the Ministry of Tourism and
Antiquities under the control of the radical cleric Moqtada A1 Sadr,245 the
same cleric who issued the ominous message that while Muslim heritage
should be respected, looting of pre-Muslim relics was permissible.246 Such a
political maneuver poses grave danger to the long-term safety of cultural
heritage. Radical sectarian groups influencing the populace to be “only
interested in Islamic sites and not Iraq’s earlier heritage” has already led to the
physical destruction of eighteen heritage sites within Iraq, most notably at
Kirkuk and Kifel.247 Worries about what could happen to the museum are,
therefore, not unfounded. A group of international archaeologists noted this
and urged the new Iraqi government to put its cultural heritage under the
Ministry of Culture, as “only a strong, national, nonpolitical State Board of
Antiquities and Heritage, backed fully by the force of the State, can preserve
the heritage that is left.”248
Past evidence supports the benefit of cultural internationalism for
cultural heritage protection in Iraq. “In the past most archaeological digs in
Iraq have had foreign sponsorship—the Germans at Babylon and Uruk, the
British at Ur and Nimrud, the French at Kish and Lagash, the Italians at Hatra,
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and the Americans at Nippur.”249 This background has paved the way for
many scholars to advocate for such a strategy of international assistance in the
museum’s recovery.
Many see this responsibility as being in the public interest.
Preserving a communal worldwide history then follows this model of
balancing “the inescapable tensions between current uses and future needs and
between private interests and mutual interests.”250 For many, there is “no
better illustration of the world-wide recognition of the legacy obligation to
future generations than the international reaction to the looting of Iraq’s
National Museum of Antiquities during the spring of 2003.”251 After all,
public management is a field that surely encompasses a state’s cultural
heritage professionals. The responsibilities of an effective public manager
speak to his or her “responsibility to future generations,” which entails
“ensuring a viable future by preserving resources and ensuring the capacity to
... preserve and transmit civilization’s cultural, intellectual, artistic, and
historical legacy.”252
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The Regrettable Conundrum Facing Cultural Heritage Protection and
Preservation in the Iraq National Museum Recovery
This debate between strategies rooted in cultural nationalism or
internationalism in the recovery of the Iraq National Museum reveals a
tradeoff that frequently escapes recognition, let alone discussion, with regard
to the museum. Specifically, this tradeoff lies, on the one hand, between the
best interests of the artifacts themselves along with long-term efforts to
cultivate and foster a global sense of cultural heritage; on the other hand lays
the best interests of the Iraqi nation as it recovers from the last decade of
warfare and the last twenty years of international sanctions. This author
favors a hybrid approach by which some artifacts would remain in-country to
serve the Iraqi people while national turmoil persists and others would be able
to travel abroad to safeguard them from physical harm and foster international
solidarity with the recovering nation.
Across the globe, the recent trends have favored cultural
internationalism. The recovery of the Iraq National Museum is no exception.
With regard to the artifacts themselves, the physical remnants of cultural
heritage often enjoy increased protection and an improved degree of
conservation when removed from source nations experiencing either armed
conflict or significant economic strife. After all, this decreases the likelihood
of damage due to bombardment and other martial movements, as well as
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damage from neglect, as source nations are forced to make difficult decisions
regarding resources. Such concerns are indeed “especially relevant in Iraq,
where resources have been, and are currently being diverted to the pressing
problems of the population and the economy.”253 In such dire situations and
the difficult decisions that they beget, artifacts can most surely be expected to
hold a lower priority than preserving human life. “Because lives are lost in
war, the goal of protecting property is controversial,” and though “the
codification of the laws of war has attempted to protect, as much as possible,
cultural property within an invaded nation,”254 as it has often been deemed a
secondary concern to preserving human life, the “effect of war, poverty,
political chaos, and instability on cultural heritage can be and often is
devastating.”255
Additionally, with regard to cultural heritage preservation as a field
of study, the artifacts and the heritage that they embody may enjoy a larger
audience. By virtue of its physical remnants being exhibited to a larger
audience abroad, Iraqi heritage could reach more individuals and communities
than if they remained within Iraq’s borders. Such circulation has the realistic
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potential to foster a wider appreciation for both Iraqi cultural achievements
and those of Middle Eastern culture in general, at a time when this
appreciation could be translated into more widespread support for the nation
as it recovers from decades of oppression followed by years of armed conflict.
This more widespread enjoyment and admiration of Iraqi cultural
accomplishments could, in turn, pave the way for increased solidarity in the
international community with Iraq as the nation continues down the course of
recovery. Such reconstruction can foster cultural heritage tourism, not to
mention the social benefits for Iraqis from sparing destruction of common
heritage amid the tribulations of modern conflict.
Though museum science in recent years has favored cultural
internationalism, its benefits come with a cost; they may pose the threat of
damage in another more intangible way. The cost of employing cultural
internationalism in the museum’s recovery comes in the form of the loss of
cultural nationalism’s benefits—namely, damage to the autonomy and
sovereignty, collective identity, and long-term cultural heritage of the
recovering Iraqi nation.
While the heritage may enjoy a larger audience by virtue of its
physical remnants being exhibited to a larger audience abroad, and thus foster
a wider appreciation for Iraqi and Middle Eastern culture, the benefit of
exposure to this heritage they represent can have on the Iraqi people in terms
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of their national identity, pride, and social education amid calamity and strife
may become sacrificed. “Cultural heritage preservation depends on its ability
to serve and build constituencies in the population,”

and this already

difficult task becomes yet more arduous when the remnants of heritage are
dispersed away from the population that needs this service. For these reasons,
there is indeed a case for pursuing a culturally nationalistic approach in
advancing the Iraq National Museum’s recovery.
Within the camp of scholarship promoting a museum recovery
strategy rooted in cultural nationalism, advocacy for “the connectedness of the
Iraqi people, themselves” being “the priority in deciding where to display
Iraq’s artifacts”257 has been the central premise. The museum “has been a
symbol of [their] emerging identity for all Iraqis, regardless of religious or
tribal affiliation.”258 While such a national identity may be difficult to define
and a purely common past may be difficult to identify, an “emphasis on the
unity and history of the people of Iraq would be extremely beneficial to the
Iraqi population” during this “state of upheaval and new beginnings,” and “the
Iraqi people would benefit from the retention and proud display of their
cultural property.”259 A museum recovery strategy rooted in cultural
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nationalism could feasibly be the first step in advancing toward this outcome.
This includes the financial benefit that cultural nationalism may pose for the
recovering Iraq. The ability to draw scholars of a variety of disciplines from
both within and without of Iraq can lead to the “development of cultural
heritage tourism for local developing economies in Iraq,” and could form the
basis for a “public relations and education campaign with local Iraqi people as
to the long-term economic value of their heritage to them.”260
This tradeoff between acting in the best interest of the global
community and acting in the best interest of the nation of Iraq exposes
colonial undertones in the debate. In this sense, the “notion of stewardship
can be “suspiciously self-serving.”261 While advocating for the cultural
property to be in the international community as opposed to the source nation
of Iraq, however altruistic the intentions may be, the world risks re-inscribing
the colonial way of thought that has been present for years. Promoting “the
notion that the Iraqi past is ‘our’ past” may give way to engaging in “a
rhetorical strategy of appropriation.”262 This notion of a common past is
rooted in Orientalism, which Edward Said and other scholars have defined as
a Western interpretation of the East deeply influenced by a European imperial
mindset and by which the West has defined itself through the lens of
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comparison with the East. After all, what it is really referencing a specific
portion of Iraq’s past— “a selective and constructed past, the past that in the
Western imagination has occupied a central position because of its biblical
connotations, or its links to urbanism and early writing.”263
What may result is the “construction of Iraq as a country of the
past, living in another time, a country that is ‘not immanent [sic] to
modernity’—hence the frequent evocations of Mesopotamia.”264 This is
indeed a “colonial way of thinking,”265 or at least a method of thought
reminiscent of colonialism. By focusing on the promotion of a global sense of
cultural heritage, as opposed to what may be in the best interests of the
recovering Iraqi nation, the world risks potentially putting the interests of the
developed Western world first at the expense of the developing Eastern world,
much as colonialism did in Iraq during the previous century.
Unfortunately, an overwhelming amount of discussion has not
acknowledged this colonial issue with regard to the Iraq National Museum’s
recovery. The relationship between states and museums has only recently
begun to be explored within the Western context, and is even newer in the
Middle East.266 While the issue of repatriation has indeed been addressed
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concerning many of the previous century’s armed conflicts, it has not entered
the discussion of the Iraq National Museum with frequency. The bulk of
discussion has consisted of Western advocacy for the merits of internationalist
approaches in the museum’s recovery, employing foreign aid and sponsorship
in the name of protecting artifacts that are held sacred for patently Western
values. What this overlooks is that, although many Arab societies trace their
origins to ancient civilizations, they are often ruled by states created relatively
recently by colonial powers, and there will often be calls “to ‘purify’ the
historical record that nationalists view as having been distorted by
colonialism.”267 Blindly ascribing to cultural internationalism can rob the
Iraqi nation of the opportunity to do this and to forge a new identity as it
recovers from years of strife, perhaps reviving a new brand of colonialism in
the twenty-first century. At the same time, strict adherence to principles of
cultural nationalism, however, may limit the appreciation of the artifacts
themselves and deprive them of a place in the international community’s
growing sense of global heritage.

267 Davis, Eric. Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modem Iraq.
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IV. The Iraq National Museum’s Past Ability to Divide and its Future
Potential to Unify

This section will demonstrate that, like all museums, the Iraq National
Museum has had a long history o f being employed as a political instrument.
This portion will also demonstrate that despite a track record o f division, the
museum nonetheless retains a tremendous potential to sow the initial seeds o f
unification. This discussion will show how this potential to unify encompasses
both a return to normalcy and a fostering a unifying sense o f national identity,
diversity, and heritage in post-war Iraq.
As a result, the museum and its collections will certainly prove
valuable in the recovery o f the Iraqi nation from the U.S.-led war. In this
process, the museum will act as a weather vane o f progress during the
reconstruction. The museum’s potential must be harnessed by both scholars
and policymakers in the United States, the new Iraq, and the world over as
recovery from war advances.

Museums as Political Instruments
It has been well established that museums have long served broad
social, cultural, educational purposes. We have learned from this analysis that
museums are also frequently used as political instruments. The Iraq National
Museum has certainly been no exception to either of these realities. Ever
since its inception, the Iraq National Museum has had a long history of being
employed as a political tool by British, Baathist, and most recently American,
anti-coalition stakeholders, and cultural heritage professionals as well. The
“unifying thread in this battle over Iraqi archaeology is power—economic,
cultural, and political power—and how people have used these powers to
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manipulate archaeology in order to preserve their authority and/or to
maximize their access to archaeological finds.”268
Since the war began in 2003, both the looters and their stolen items
have both reinforced the museum’s status as a symbol of state power. The
museum’s appropriation by various stakeholders for self-preservation has
been central to discussions of the United States’ failure to anticipate and
prevent the looting. Additionally, the resulting discussion concerning the
merits of pursuing a museum recovery strategy rooted in either cultural
nationalism or cultural internationalism has continued the museum’s history
of being appropriated politically.
The looting underscores that, in Iraq as well as elsewhere, cultural
heritage is connected to politics. “Ultimately, the demolition of much of Iraqi
archaeological heritage was emblematic of the ruinous and violent politics of
recent Iraqi history.”269 During peacetime, heritage engaged civil officials to
promote national unity. During wartime, not only opposing militaries but
downtrodden citizens appropriated and destroyed heritage objects. During the
recovery from this conflict, the museum has been used by scholars and
policymakers alike to both condemn and uphold controversial political
agendas.
268Bernhardsson, Magnus T. Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation
Building in Modem Iraq. University of Texas Press, 2006, pp. 4.
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Given its political resonance, the Iraq National Museum, like all
museums, can be exploited for division or unification. The Iraq National
Museum nonetheless retains a tremendous potential to sow the seeds of a
nascent unity. It is imperative that this potential be recognized and harnessed
by not only scholars, but policymakers as well, in both the United States and
the new Iraq, as well as in the international community, as recovery from the
years of war progresses.

The Museum’s Proven Ability to Divide
The Iraq National Museum has been used as an instrument of
politics ever since its inception. Looking back to the British formation of
modern-day Iraq and installation of the British-sponsored Faisal monarchy,
Gertrude Bell exerted a great deal of influence during this time on the
formation of the museum and its evolution within the country’s Ministry of
Public Works.
The location of the Museum within this Ministry is meaningful.
According to Bell’s legislation, the Department of Antiquities, and thus, the
museum, was placed under the Ministry of Public Works rather than the
Ministry of Education.270 This implied that the museum provided a public
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service to citizens—a service less tangible than, perhaps, sanitation or utilities,
but no less important. This service provided by the national museum was the
beginnings of a national identity.
Indeed, archaeology has played a central role in the development
of Iraqi national identity. “Ruling elites” had long “manipulated the past” for
this purpose in Iraq.271 Gertrude Bell and her contemporaries were essentially
resurrecting the Mesopotamian past for this purpose. Linking archaeology
with identity continued during the Baathist regime from 1968 to 2003. During
this time, Saddam Hussein rose to power in 1979 and employed the museum’s
collections to portray himself as the heir to ancient Babylon, and the
perception of the museum as a physical manifestation of Baathist power
would later come to fuel a large portion of the looting and destruction that
took place in April 2003. The looting and destruction that the citizen looters
wrought upon the museum was the most obvious confirmation of this
connection, with the destruction being a visible manifestation of the internal
anger and frustration felt by generations oppressed by Baathist policies.
In the years after the initial invasion, during the longer period of
insurgency, factions within Iraq’s fledgling government appropriated the
museum to sow both anti-occupation discord and self-advancement. With the
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State Board of Antiquities and Heritage being directed by two ministries—the
Sunni-controlled Ministry of Culture and the Shiite-run Ministry of Tourism
and Antiquities— “politically motivated efforts have rendered it virtually
ineffective.”272 It is with relative ease that one can perceive how the museum,
despite being an institution “designed to protect Iraq’s cultural heritage,” by
virtue of falling under the jurisdiction of this now-factional State Board of
Antiquities and Heritage, “[had become] exploited” by rival factions “for
political gain.”273
As the new government took shape, the museum’s new location
became notable. In 2006, “the museum was reassigned to the Ministry of
Tourism and Antiquities under the control of the radical Shiite cleric Moktada
al-Sadr” while international archaeologists urged the new Iraqi government to
place its cultural heritage under the Ministry of Culture where a “strong,
national, nonpolitical State Board of Antiquities and Heritage, backed fully by
the force of the State, [could] preserve the heritage that [was] left.”274 The
museum and its contents occupy a central place in the economic and symbolic
benefits of heritage tourism. Many observers, however, remain skeptical and
question what portion of this maneuver may have been accomplished to
272 Detwiler, Elizabeth. “Iraq’s Cultural Heritage: Preserving the Past for the Sake of the
Future.” United States Institute of Peace. October Briefing (2008), p. 2.
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Nationalistic Laws and Politics.” Chronicle of Higher Education. Vol. 54, No. 43
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maintain Shiite control of the museum after years under Sunni Baathist
control.
Additionally, during this time, public officials tellingly drew the
distinction between Islamic artifacts and Mesopotamian artifacts, granting
permission for citizens to loot Mesopotamian artifacts but not Islamic ones.275
The implication was that the Islamic heritage was not lootable, presumably by
virtue of it being sacred, while the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian heritage was
lootable by virtue of it being profane in comparison.
Furthermore, “there is a significant link between smugglers of
cultural property and smugglers of weapons.”276 United States officials have
frequently caught insurgents in possession of both weapons and antiquities. In
fact, the illicit trade in antiquities has become a growing source of revenue for
insurgents to fund terrorism as more traditional means have been combated.277
Long after the invasion, “the scenario [had] been repeated many times,”278 as
security forces pursued leads for weapons and insurgents, they frequently
found antiquities, finding “vases, cylinder seals, and statuettes” along with
other “tools of their trade,” such as automatic weapons, ammunition, and
275 Jenkins, Simon. “In Iraq's Four-year Looting Frenzy, the Allies Have Become the
Vandals.” The Guardian. Vol. 6, No. 8 (2007), p. 2.
276 Huang, Edythe E. “Looting in Iraq, Five Years Later: An Evaluation of the International
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uniforms.279 Government agents have been keen to point out the use of
heritage as a weapon in this struggle. The association indicates this obscured
reality. Symbolically, artifacts were being collocated with weapons because
the cultural heritage embodied within these artifacts was itself also being
employed as a weapon.
Within Iraq, coalition members, mainly United States soldiers and
officials, were also complicit. For many, their “collusion in such destruction”
of Iraq's heritage was “a scandal that will outlive any passing conflict.”280
This encompassed their role in the looting and destruction by virtue of neither
anticipating it nor halting it, as well as any shortcomings in artifact recovery
efforts.
Outside of Iraq, the museum was also used as a device to either
condemn or justify U.S. foreign policy around the 2003 invasion. Opponents
and critics of U.S. foreign policy used the museum and its plight as a device to
condemn U.S. war efforts. As the invasion approached, “archaeologists often
played a role in campus teach-ins and off-campus protests” and thus “cast
their opposition to the war in terms of the war’s threat to the common heritage
of mankind ... claiming that the entire country of Iraq had to be treated like a
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museum piece.”281 Tragically, this aversion to appearing complicit in the war
effort led hesitation among some to risk the perception of endorsing the
invasion by offering hands-on aid to the U.S. in taking more widespread
precautionary measures to protect the museum.
Many heritage professionals questioned whether it was ethical to
work with the military, specifically in situations such as the contested Iraq
war. A number of archaeologists were disinclined to work with military.
Chief reasons for this stance included the claims that all of Iraq is “a vast
archaeological site” and that “providing a list of selected sites” to avoid might
give the armies “carte blanche” to operate destructively elsewhere, that
collusion itself was “a political ... gesture” since no invasion could ever be
justified,282 as well as that advising administration officials with regard to
cultural property amounted to collusion in the war’s preparation and thus
provided “academic and cultural legitimacy” to the invasion.283
In this dialog, the museum became exploited by a number of
foreign stakeholders. As previously discussed, one need only look to
supporters of the American war effort at home criticizing the exaggerated
claims that resulted from the looting and critics of the invasion using the
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events at the museum to highlight the cultural tragedy of the looting in order
to witness the degree to which many used the plight of the museum during the
conflict to offer either support or condemnation of the administration’s
policies. While this may not be the same tangible level of appropriation that
states and armies have practiced with the museum in the past, it is nonetheless
self-serving in the same manner.
The White House’s and State Department’s act of initially
downplaying the disaster revealed its underlying anger and embarrassment,
and the decision to open the museum for a two-hour media event in July 2003
revealed the administration’s “[eagerness] to put the controversy behind
them.”

Those supporting the war also voiced an alarmingly wide array of

inaccurate narratives concerning the looting to justify the U.S. decision to
invade—e.g., that the Iraqi populace must not have cared about their own
heritage since they chose to plunder it, or that the Iraqis took such pride in
their heritage that they were compelled to symbolically seize it back from the
Baathist regime and protect it from destruction in the fog of war.
In this light, the employment of the museum for purposes of
propaganda emerges—an action that did not go unnoticed by the Iraqi people.
Some Middle Easter news commentary lamented the positive propaganda
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messages coming from the U.S. officials,285 in contrast with the “horrid”
looting and “atmosphere of lawlessness” stemming from inadequate patrolling
after the fall of Baghdad.286 The new Iraqi government, however, did no
better. Six years later, like the United States, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
held another reopening ceremony for the museum and declared his
administration’s desire for the museum to be “at the forefront of international
museums” and for Iraq to be a “Mecca for research” into the history of
mankind.287 Some coverage was keen to note the political opportunism
behind this reopening, remarking how it was done “in haste for political
purposes to boost [the prime minister’s] image and demonstrate to the public
that life [was] returning to normal in Iraq.”288
Turning to cultural heritage professionals, many find such
individuals to remain the only unblemished party. Indeed, the efforts of Dr.
George and the small staff that remained were commendable, as were the
efforts of numerous heritage professionals who advocated for the museum
amid the calamity, but after years of Baathist collusion, avoiding any sense of
complicity is difficult for the museum as an institution. The majority of
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scholars have remained convinced of the curators’ blamelessness, remarking
that “they may have been Baathists, but they weren’t criminals.”289
Unfortunately, however, the appearance of impropriety is often conflated with
impropriety itself, a sentiment that has no doubt cast a cloud over the
institution of the museum.
Museum and heritage professionals, thus, are not entirely exempt
from culpability in appropriating the museum for their own benefit. Scholarly
exploitation of Iraq is indeed a reality. Western professors have occasionally
been caught smuggling artifacts out of Iraq, something which Middle Eastern
news outlets have made a point of highlighting.290 In addition to this, a
significant number of heritage professionals effectively “leveraged guilt into
resources” by “[producing] shock and grief at [the] loss of such unprecedented
magnitude” and “[provoking] rage at the cultural callousness of the United
States in failing to prevent this predictable tragedy.”291 Some good arguably
stemmed from this. After all, there is “more interest in Mesopotamian
archaeology now than there ever has been,”292 and there is “a significantly
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greater awareness ... of the importance of the cultural heritage and the
responsibilities” of governments “to protect it.”293
Despite the good stemming from this, one could also make the case
for it having engendered some bad as well. Though scholars gained favorable
interest in the issue, it was arguably unethical, however, to disguise selfinterest as service to humanity. Furthermore, years of association with the
Baathist regime can be viewed as unethical. This produced an appearance of
corruption or impropriety with Baathists on staff and Hussein relatives in
leadership that many journalists have referred to as a “cloud [hanging] over
the museum.”294
Additionally, the biased response of Western archaeologists in
favor of access to excavations at any cost obfuscated years of “continual
complicity with the [Baathist] regime.”295 It is no secret that Saddam
Hussein’s obsession with Babylonian heritage created ideal working
conditions for Western archaeologists, which many capitalized upon while
turning a blind eye to the regime’s brutal actions elsewhere. While this was
not true of all archaeologists in Iraq, it was prevalent enough to trigger cries of
archaeology unethically mingling with regimes and armed forces. Given the
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application of such leverage after years of complicity, the “pursuit of selfinterest” appears to have been disguised “beneath the language of service to
the heritage of humankind or the Iraqi people.”296
Ultimately, this amounted to a sacking of the culture reminiscent
of colonialism that continues today. Though not frequently mentioned in the
discourse, the irony behind the American administration seeking to protect
artifacts that it had put in danger in the first place was palpable.297
Additionally, recalling that the notion of a shared heritage was the motive
voiced by many to protect Iraq’s cultural property, it cannot be ignored that
this was a “rhetorical strategy of appropriation” that aided in the “construction
of Iraq as a country of the past, living in another time, a country that is ‘not
immanent [sic] to modernity’.”298
A1 Jazeera coverage in the aftermath of the looting underscores
this. This commentary showed how the Iraq National Museum was not the
only bastion of heritage that suffered from the looting. Rather, smaller
regional museums, archaeological sites, libraries, and heritage institutions
suffered no less. Some coverage focused on the loss of film heritage, noting
how the looting of public institutions destroyed the national theatre and

296 Joffe, p. 40
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destroyed master reels of the earliest Iraqi films forever.299,300 The coverage
also paid a fair amount of attention to site looting in Iraq. By 2004, Middle
Eastern commentators noted how the museum was last year’s focus and how
the looting of smaller museums in southern Iraq by increasingly organized
gangs301 and unexcavated site looting were the more current travesties against
heritage.302 Reports of the World Monument Fund declaring all of Iraq to be
“an endangered site”—the first time this had been declared for an entire
country—underscored the attention paid to cultural heritage not housed within
the national museum.303
Furthermore, former Director of the Iraq National Museum Dr.
Donny George voiced his opinion that the British Museum was the obvious
partner in helping the museum recover from this tragedy.304 Considered in
tandem with success stories focusing on high-value items missing from
museum profiles on high profile items, such as the Warka Mask being
recovered with the help of “saviors” like a New York prosecutor and
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policeman,305 as well as six hundred missing artifacts being found at the prime
minister’s office and displayed at the museum,306 one must acknowledge the
parallels between this sentiment and the nation’s colonial past. In this regard,
considering the wanton destruction of cultural property amid the armed
conflict of the invasion and the search for rescue from Western sources, it
appeared that “we have advanced little since the imperial nineteenth
century.”307
What emerges from this examination is the reality that the Iraq
National Museum has had a long history of being used as a political tool. This
history is likely to be far from over. Complicit parties in this misappropriation
included the United States and other foreign stakeholders, the new Iraqi
government, as well as cultural heritage professionals.

The Museum's Potential to Signify a Return to Normalcy
Despite this potential to be used as a political tool to divide, the
museum nonetheless retains a rich potential to foster some future semblance
of unification. The museum and its collections may prove valuable as an
indicator of a post-war return to normalcy within Iraq, by virtue of the fact
305 Iraq’s Mona Lisa returns. (2003, September 24). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www. alj azeera.com/.
306 Iraq recovers lost artefacts [sic]. (2010, September 21). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
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that increased conservation will result when the security situation improves,
and foment a nascent sense of identity upon which to further unify. Given
how many Iraqis saw it as symbolic of the greater breakdown of order, it
should come as no surprise that the museum is used as a gauge for the
recovery from this breakdown. Hence, success stories that are highlighted
ultimately exploit the museum for political purposes.
A number of efforts within Iraq’s new government have improved
the conservation of cultural heritage as the nation recovers. For instance, the
Iraqi government established the Iraq Cultural Heritage Conservation
Initiative within the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage to increase the
capacity to “document, manage, and conserve the country’s cultural heritage
through training, support for academic education, development of methods for
site documentation and assessment.”308 As the security situation in Iraq
improves, this initiative will increasingly undertake missions to evaluate and
assist in the conservation of national cultural sites and institutions. More
recently, the museum has been working with Google to digitize its collections.
Amira Edan, the museum’s current director, has declared her aspiration of this
project “[marking] another step toward normalcy,” while others have voiced
hope that such efforts will “show that it’s possible to do business in Iraq, that
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Iraq is an important market that will grow quickly, that it’s sufficiently stable
... and that it’s a safe place to be.”309
Given such efforts and the previous climate permissive to the
looting of antiquities, one potential metric of a return to normalcy in Iraq may
be when the nation can protect the remnants of its own cultural heritage
without foreign aid. After all, when “cultural heritage is sacrificed, it is likely
that many other aspects of life that mark us as human beings are also being
sacrificed.”310 As assistance programs in Iraq, both foreign and domestic,
help to grow expertise, “Iraq may soon be able to independently undertake the
protection and management of its cultural heritage,” with the measure of
success “not [being] evident in the number of monuments saved, but in the
capacity of Iraq to save them independent of foreign help.”311 The Museum
can, therefore, act as a weather vane of progress in reconstruction.
In the midst of armed conflict, as well as periods of recovery from
such strife, cultural property has the potential to educate and unify cultures, as
well as to preserve a sense of identity that could otherwise be lost. It is well
established that, for countless generations, art and craft that has now become
cultural property “has been used to illustrate the life styles and important
309 Google to put Iraqi museum online. (2009, November 24). A1 Jazeera. Retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/.
310 Gerstenblith, Patty. “From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of
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aspects of civilizations,” and it has remained “an important source of
continuing education for a unifying social culture, especially in the rebuilding
process after armed conflict.”312 In this light, the educational value of the
remnants of cultural heritage is, arguably, at its most important during such
times of strife. If, for centuries of armed conflict, the destruction of a group’s
cultural heritage has amounted to the elimination of their identity and
“[facilitated] the degradation of that society,”313 then safeguarding and
exhibiting cultural property during strife could, conversely, achieve the
preservation of that identity and promote admiration for that culture both at
home and in the international community.
Much like the act of blogging has, in recent years, pointed the
mainstream press to storylines that really matter to populations, the museum’s
holdings may be able to similarly point widespread elements of international
society to what really matters to Iraqis. Benefits may include providing a
voice to overlooked scholars of cultural heritage, a wider awareness for
unvoiced causes, and an “alternative source” of information in countries long
“under the thumb” of the state.314
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The Museum’s Capacity to Foster National Unity
Aside from a return to normalcy, the museum can foster an Iraqi
national identity and sense of pride. The museum has long been “a powerful
tool that has promoted group identity in Iraq and provided meaning for
countless Iraqis during periods of intense political and social change.”315 At
the turn of the previous century, Gertrude Bell’s work tapped an emerging
sense of nationalism, giving the Iraqis control over their heritage and, thus,
control over their past as well. Bell “was not the instigator of nationalist ideas
in the county, for they were already emerging,” but “she gave the people of
/■

Iraq control over their antiquities and therefore control over their past.”
This sense of nationalism that the museum embodied is vital for the success of
i n

new nations, “an essential component for a new country to be successful.”
Bell saw this potential in the early twentieth century, noting that
“displays of ancient Mesopotamian achievements would bolster Iraqi
confidence in the future of the new nation.”318 These hopes, however, are not
new to the twenty-first century. Rather, it is equally true now as it was at the
turn of the twentieth century when the nation was formed. As a result, the
museum can remain a symbol of emerging identity for all Iraqis, regardless of
315 Bemhardsson, p. 220
316 Lewis, Erin. “Gertrude Bell and Archaeology in Iraq: From World War I to the ‘War on
Terror’.” The Post Hole. Issue 9 (2012), p. 17.
317 Erin Lewis, p. 17
318 Foster, Benjamin, Karen Polinger Foster, and Patty Gerstenblith. “Iraq Beyond the
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religion or tribe. The Iraqi people can look to this common heritage and draw
upon it to redefine nationhood after years of division and conflict. More
importantly, the Iraqi people can draw their own conclusions from this history
and produce their own narratives, not just those that Western nations would
favor. This is imperative in order to avoid simply repeating colonialism’s
effects in the twenty-first century.
There is now similar hope that these same secular pre-Islamic
artifacts might bolster Iraqi confidence and pride in the nation, which can
counter religious and tribal strife in the modern era. Just as a sense of unity
was previously “developed during a restless and chaotic era immediately
following independence,” a nation-building process similarly based on ancient
history and archaeology may occur.319 The “museum’s holdings consist
almost entirely of pre-Islamic art, some as old as 6,000 years.”320 While may
seem counterintuitive that Islamists would value pre-Islamic artifacts, plenty
of ruling elites have been enamored with the feelings of Mesopotamian
exceptionalism they inspire, so it stands to reason that the same could be true
for commoners as well. These artifacts are “rich with common ancestry that
predates the splits among Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite.”321 It stands to reason
that in today’s Iraq, “where religious and tribal differences create a divisive
319 Bemhardsson, pp. 165, 218
320 Stevens, Lt. Erin A. “The Cultural Sword: Leveraging Cultural Property in Iraq.”
University of Military Intelligence, Fort Huachuca, AZ (2008), p. 3.
321 Bogdanos, Matthew. “Fighting for Iraq’s Culture.” New York Times. (March 6, 2007).
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and violent climate,” this secular history that “juxtaposes against the Islamic
radicalism and sectarianism at the root of violence in the country today” holds
the “potential to create a sense of historical unity .”322
As many scholars have noted, cultural heritage preservation thrives
upon inclusivity. It “depends on its ability to serve and build constituencies in
the population at large,” with no group feeling disenfranchised or left
behind.323 In order for cultural heritage preservation “to be successful,” it
“must have meaning for everyone and be the concern of all.”324 This notion
of inclusivity leads to “the perception of a common culture and common past”
that is “one way of learning that one is part of a community. The very power
of ... artifacts [has been] in their ability to use symbols and imagery to
provide a sense of belonging to a group or community, a fundamental element
of patriotism.”325
To this end, rather than merely propping up the ruling party’s
historical narrative, the museum can give special voice to multiple
communities by addressing Iraq’s long overlooked diversity, even if
respective historic narratives are conflicting. This can and should include
specific attention to the deeply felt tribal and religious differences that the
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U.S. initially ignored in its war planning. By virtue of predating modern-day
strife, the Mesopotamian period stands poised as a solid common ground and
a potential building block upon which to begin the long-term process of
circumventing the modern splits among Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite.
In addressing the nation’s diversity and competing historical
narratives, the museum can provide context to the many eras of strife within
Iraqi heritage. If “the Iraqi nation is to fully recover from the trauma of its
past, it will need to come to terms with that past and seek motivation and
guidance in its history,” and the avenue upon which to do so may be found in
the nation’s rich ancient history embodied in the national museum’s
holding.327
Context is vital to the field of archaeology. For this reason,
artifacts are able to draw attention to “context-specific power relationships,
class and other social inequalities and asymmetries.”

In the case of the Iraq

National Museum, therefore, context can communicate broader truths to the
citizenry concerning broad elements such as Mesopotamian roots, the Islamic
faith, periods of British colonialism and early nationhood, years of Baathist
alienation, and the U.S. invasion and subsequent new government.
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This is in sharp contrast to the years of cultural heritage
preservation in Iraq being “less concerned with answering universal, allengrossing questions,” but rather with “an explanation of how contemporary
Iraqis are the inheritors and descendants of certain ancient peoples and their
civilizations. This construction has been deliberate ... with political purposes
in mind ... to appeal to the citizens nationwide and thus be suggestive of how
Iraq’s history is genealogical and linear and not multidimensional.”329
One must remain aware, however, that this gives people the power
to do as they wish with their own heritage. Recalling that “a national museum
is bound to have potential in the state-building process in a recently
established nation such as Iraq, with its numerous ethnic and religious
groups,” museums “seldom attempt to present the complexity of history or to
accentuate differing interpretations.”330 As multiple narratives are addressed,
some are bound to be conflicting. Being aware that “the ethic of conservation
is a context-specific principle ... some social groups may choose to place
value not on the conservation of the material past but on its reworking,
recycling, or even destruction.”331 If the Iraqi populace gaining control over
their antiquities amounted to control over the heritage that is embodied in the
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artifacts, then having control of this past must include the freedom to present
and address it as they best see fit.

The Museum’s Role Moving Forward
National museums are to be considered an outward sign of
independent nations. After all, they are “the first physical manifestation of a
country’s independence, as a sign of that country’s claim to its place” among
the world’s great nations.332 The Iraq National Museum, then, should not be
considered any different. As “the new governments in the Middle East fought
with the old imperial powers and structures ... to exercise full authority over
cultural resources” in an attempt to be “more fully in control of their destiny,”
the Iraq National Museum was “most fitting for the newly independent
country” as “the massive amounts of artifacts” in its holdings could also be
“displayed for the enrichment of public cultural life.”333 The same remains
equally true today. The reopening and proper functioning of the Iraq National
Museum may simultaneously educate the Iraqi people of this independence
and signal the nation’s rightful place to the international community. After
all, if this is the U.S. goal in Iraq—to return the nation to a pre-totalitarian
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state of affairs—then the museum’s restoration and functioning is equally in
the best interests of the U.S. as it is of the Iraqis.
Moving forward, this potential to unite must be harnessed by
scholars and policymakers alike. Though abundant now, the nation’s oil
resources will eventually be depleted, but antiquities will always remain. As a
resource, antiquities are indeed plentiful within Iraq’s borders and more are
waiting to be tapped. In fact, the areas yet to be formally excavated and
cataloged in the museum is four times greater than the museum’s collections
and the areas formally excavated in the past hundred years.334 It is with peril
that the role that heritage plays in nation-building is overlooked. If the “center
of gravity” of United States counterinsurgency operations “is the people, then
their cultural heritage is the conscience of the people, often serving as ... a
visible symbol of their society.”335
The United States must incorporate cultural property protection
into its future post-conflict stabilization operations abroad.336 Naturally, this
would entail not only recognizing the formidable power that cultural heritage
possesses, but also allowing for the benefit of its influence to be exerted. As
United States doctrine evolves, cultural heritage protection must be a focal

334 Detwiler, p. 2
335 Jackson, Dick. “Cultural Property Protection in Stability Operations.” Army Law. (2008),
p. 47.
336 Detwiler, p. 3

128

point in both counterinsurgency and stability operations in the future. The
unifying potential posed by the museum can and must be capitalized upon to
signify a return to peace in Iraq, but perhaps more importantly to solidify its
national identity, as well as to preserve this rich and ancient heritage well into
future generations.
It is, however, important to recall the British influence in the
formation of the Iraq National Museum, comprehending that the Iraqi
populace essentially inherited their national museum rather than creating it.
After all, the museum’s “establishment was not the result of wealthy
patronage or philanthropy;” rather “initial efforts for creating the Museum
were performed by non-Iraqis,” with the subtext of reflecting an Iraq
“designed to be a compliant country that would honor faithfully Britain’s local
strategic and economic interests.” 337 The museum is now in the unique
position to break from these colonial roots and assert Iraq’s new identity in the
twenty-first century rather than reinforcing its post-colonial identity of
yesteryear.
If museums are symbols of power, then it stands to reason that the
Iraq National Museum can empower a people just as it has done for regimes.
This can, in turn, ensure long-term preservation of artifacts and longevity of
scholarship, as a profound resonance with the populace and a collective
337 Bemhardsson, pp. 150, 109
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identity or conscience are the first steps in securing the survival of material
culture. Only when this occurs can cultural property be more certain of
enduring preservation.

130

Conclusion and Summary

The looting o f the Iraq National Museum in 2003 sparked debates over
responsibility and questions concerning the appropriate approach to museum
reconstruction. These debates reveal the symbolic power o f the museum as an
institution—a power that history has shown to be capable o f division, but
nonetheless retains tremendous potential fo r unification.
In the wake o f the looting o f the Iraq National Museum during the
2003 U.S.-led invasion, an analysis o f the looters, the materials looted, and
the permissive socio-cultural environment reveals the cultural heritage
embodied in the museum’s holdings to have been appropriated by all
stakeholders fo r the purpose o f furthering their own competing interests.
The majority o f debate arising from these events centered on the
United States’ possible violation o f international law and whether a theory o f
cultural nationalism or internationalism is most appropriate in repairing the
museum. This discussion highlighted several conundrums facing heritage
protection and preservation. Debate over U.S. responsibility fo r the looting
revealed the inadequacy o f legislation alone in protecting cultural heritage,
while debates between approaches o f cultural nationalism or internationalism
as the proper path forward revealed a tragic tradeoff between what may be
ideal fo r the global community and what may be in the best interests o f the
Iraqi nation.
Despite the museum’s proven potential to divide, it nonetheless retains
tremendous future potential to unify. This must be capitalized upon by
heritage professionals and policy makers alike to signify a return to normalcy
in Iraq and to preserve its national identity, diversity, and heritage.

Looting is a phenomenon that so violates social mores that
episodes of it merit examination, particularly when the loot is cultural
property. The literature on the topic has shown potential looters, an
availability of valued goods, an absence of restraining factors, and a
permissive socio-cultural environment to be the four key contributors of

131

episodes of looting, as well as economic, symbolic, and selective to be the
main three distinct types of looting.
This thesis examined the 2003 looting of the Iraq National
Museum under this lens and found that the looting episode had both economic
and symbolic significance. As expected, all four contributing components
were present leading up to the 2003 looting of the Iraq museum and, notably,
all three types of looting occurred as the museum’s contents were ransacked.
Four distinct stakeholders emerged in this analysis—invading U.S.
forces, outgoing Baathist officials, museum staff, and Iraqi citizens—each
having different competing values of cultural heritage and its preservation.
The opposition between these four groups revealed the cultural heritage
embodied in the museum’s holdings to have been appropriated by all four
parties for the purpose of furthering their own competing interests.
The next sections recalled the debate that arose from these events,
and attempted to cull larger revelations from these discussions. The majority
of dialogue can be categorized as pertaining to whether the U.S. violated
international law and whether a theory of cultural nationalism or
internationalism is most appropriate in repairing the museum.
This essay showed how the primary arguments supporting the
United States having violated international law focus on reading the intent
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behind relevant international tenets within a spirit of national harmony with
international standards, while most opinion against a violation of international
law focus on a more literal reading of the law and minimal obligations toward
compliance.
Thus, this thesis has argued that relevant legislation at the national
and international levels is a not only flawed but inherently insufficient means
to protect cultural heritage. Rather, a true national desire and legitimate
conviction to protect cultural property must accompany any legislation in
order to achieve effective cultural heritage protection.
The third section demonstrated that the prevailing preference
among museum professionals has been to favor cultural internationalism. It
argued that approaches rooted in cultural nationalism tend to be better for the
source nation of the artifacts, while cultural internationalism often benefits the
artifacts themselves, the field of study, and the global community. This
debate revealed a bitter tradeoff between the best foreign interests and those of
the recovering Iraqi nation.
The final section of this thesis argued that the Iraq National
Museum, like most museums, has had a long history of being employed as a
political tool, and called attention to its proven track record of fostering a
spirit of division. This discussion recounted how use of the museum as an
instrument of politics began with the British formation of modern-day Iraq
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and installation of the Faisal monarchy, continued with the Baathist regime’s
use of the museum to legitimize their claim to power by way of connecting
itself to the region’s past glories, and again surfaced as the United States and
the new Iraqi government also appropriating the museum to legitimize their
efforts during the longer period of insurgency that followed. All the while,
the museum was also used as a device to either condemn or justify U.S.
foreign policy regarding the invasion and occupation both in the U.S. and the
international community.
Nevertheless, cultural property retains the potential to educate and
unify cultures, as well as to preserve a sense of identity that could otherwise
be lost in the midst of armed conflict and periods of recovery from strife. As
a result, this analysis revealed the museum’s role as a weather vane of
progress in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq and its ample potential to sow
the seeds of a nascent unification despite its discordant history.
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APPENDIX—BACKGROUND ON WORKS CITED

This examination of the looting of the Iraq National Museum made use of a
variety of types of sources in order to address the legal and policy
implications of these events from an interdisciplinary standpoint. It consulted
sources that examine the psychology of looting in general, as well as
economists and contemporary historians to illustrate what could have led to
these events. It looked to the journalistic coverage from shortly after the
looting occurred in order to gauge both the Western and the Middle Eastern
reaction. It also consulted jurisprudence and legal opinion to examine what
preventative measures could and should have been done, as well as museum
and heritage professionals to entertain proposals of what may be pursued in
the museum’s recovery. These sources are categorized below to provide
further context.

Domestic Heritage Professionals
Robert McC. Adams—Archaeologist and professor of anthropology known
for pioneering research in Iraq and multiethnic violence, and former
Secretary of the Smithsonian
James Cuno—Art historian, President and Director of the Art Institute of
Chicago, and former Director of Harvard University Art Museums
Eric Davis—Author and professor of political science, Director of the Center
for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University
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Benjamin Foster—Professor of Mesopotamian literature, and economic and
social history
Karen Polinger Foster—Professor of Bronze Age art and iconography
Laura Gawron—Master of Arts in Museum Professions
McGuire Gibson—Professor of Mesopotamian Archaeology at the University
of Chicago’s Oriental Institute and President of American Association
for Research in Baghdad
Alexander Joffe—Archaeologist and professor of Near Eastern studies, as
well as associate of Global Policy Exchange, Ltd. (an organization
focusing on the role of culture in international affairs)
John Russell—Professor of art, as well as former Deputy Advisor to the Iraqi
Minister of Culture and the Coalition Provisional Authority

Foreign Heritage Professionals
Magnus Bemhardsson—Icelandic professor of Near East history with a focus
on archaeology and nationalism in the modem Middle East
Joaquin Marfa Cordoba — Spanish professor, researcher, and archaeologist
with the Universidad Autonoma de Madrid
John Curtis—Keeper of the Department of the Middle East at the British
Museum
Yannis Hamilakis—Cretan Professor of archaeology with a focus on the
historically contingent nature of archaeology as a device of Western
modernity and the socio-politics of archaeology, founder of Radical
Archaeology Forum, and well-known advocate of politically
committed archaeological practice
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Erin Lewis—Archaeology student writing for a student-run journal at the
University of York (U.K.)
Gabriel Moshenska—U.K. professor of public archaeology with a focus on
nationalistic constructions of past and civilian experience of war
Gaetano Palumbo—Italian archaeologist specializing in Middle Eastern
archaeology, conservation specialist at the Getty Conservation
Institute, and former Director of Archaeological Conservation at the
World Monuments Fund
Peter Stone—U.K. professor interested in the ethics of cultural heritage
experts working with militaries, former Chief Executive Officer of the
World Archaeological Congress, and former archaeological advisor to
the British Ministry of Defence prior to the Iraq invasion

Middle Eastern Heritage Professionals
Joanne Bajjaly—Independent archaeologist and journalist covering the
Middle East
Donny George—Iraqi professor of Asian and Asian-American studies, former
Director of the Iraq National Museum at the time of the invasion,
former faculty member at the University of Baghdad
Nada Shabout—Professor of modern Iraqi art, Ajnerican of Iranian descent
who spent a significant portion of her youth in Iraq
Lamia Al-Gailani Werr—Iraqi archaeologist and historian of the Ancient Near
East, former advisor to the Iraq Museum by the Iraqi Reconstruction
and Development Council in Baghdad, and honorary member of the
British School of Archaeology in Iraq and a valued advisor to its
Council.
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Military and Government Agents
Matthew Bogdanos—U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Colonel and New York
assistant district attorney with advanced degrees in classics, law, and
military strategy who has been decorated for efforts as the former
leader of the U.S. investigation into the looting of the Iraq National
Museum and artifact recovery effort and continues to hunt for stolen
antiquities at the district attorney’s office
Elizabeth Detwiler—Program assistant at the Center for Post-conflict Peace
and Stability Operations (a team dedicated to social and economic
reconstruction) at the U.S. Institute of Peace (an independent
institution established and funded by Congress to promote global
peace-building efforts)
Lt. Erin Stevens—Army reservist and veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom
who studied Cultural Policy and Arts Management at University
College—Dublin and has written on the subject for the University of
Military Intelligence
Ann Hitchcock—Chief Curator for the U.S. National Park Service who is
active in the service’s Museum Management Program
Dick Jackson—Special Assistant to the Army Judge Advocate General for
Law of War Matters, retired U.S. Army Colonel with experience as
legal advisor in joint and combined operations in Iraq, and former
NATO legal advisor
Lawrence Kumins—Specialist in energy policy in the Resources, Science, and
Industry Divisions of the Congressional Research Service
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Jurisprudence

—

Professors, attorneys, and legal journalists

Reem Bahdi—Canadian professor of human rights and national security laws,
particularly in the Palestinian context, former Director of the Women’s
Human Rights Resources project at the University of Toronto
Patty Gerstenblith—U.S. professor of law with a focus on cultural heritage
law, Chairman of the Lawyer’s Committee for Cultural Heritage
Preservation, member of the President’s Cultural Property Advisory
Committee from 2000-2003, and Editor in Chief for International
Journal of Cultural Property
Edythe Huang—Attorney with a focus on civil international law, former
Editor in Chief of Race and the Law Review at Rutgers University
John Henry Merryman—U.S. professor of law and internationally renowned
expert on art and cultural property law, as well as comparative law
Jordan Paust—U.S. professor of international law who is among the most
cited of American law professors and has served on a number of
committees regarding international law, human rights, laws of war,
terrorism, and the use of force
Ian Ralby—American international law attorney based in Europe and former
clerk for the Iraq Special Tribunal with a practice focusing on
expertise in international criminal law, international conflict
resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction
A number of students, practitioners, and legal journalists in international and
comparative law who have written on the topic of ethical lawyering in
the Global War on Terrorism, including: Courtney Campbell, Amy
Miller, Sasha Paroff, Kirsten Petersen, William Smith, Matthew
Thurlow, and Lindsay Willis
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Other Journalists, Think Tanks, Professors, etc.
—

A number of A1 Jazeera in English articles
Neal Ascherson—Scottish journalist for The Guardian, editor at Public
Archaeology, and visiting professor at the Institute of Archaeology at
University College—London
Daniel Drezner and Henry Farrell—American political science and
international affairs professors that have actively written and blogged
on the looting of the Iraq National Museum
Elizabeth Ferris and Matthew Hall—Directors of the Brookings—London
School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement with a focus on
the international community’s response to humanitarian crises
Scott Harding—Assistant Professor at the School of Social Work at the
University of Connecticut
Simon Jenkins—Award-winning journalist for The Guardian, former U.K.
Deputy Chairman of English Heritage
Andrew Lawler—Freelance writer who has written extensively on Middle
Eastern archaeology, regular contributor to Science and Archaeology
Magazine
Carol Lewis—U.S. professor of political science with a focus on the ethics of
public service
Roger MacGinty—U.K. professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the
Humanitarian and Conflict Resolution Institute with a focus on
international peace-support interventions and local reactions to these
interventions
Lawrence Rothfield—Professor of English and comparative literature, as well
as co-founder of the University of Chicago’s Cultural Policy Center,
with a focus on public good of arts, humanities, and heritage
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Samuel Schubert—Writer for the Institute for Human and Social Studies at
the Austrian National Defense Academy
Wayne Sandholtz—U.S. political science professor with a focus on
international norms and institutions, funded by grants from the Center
for Global Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California
Dennis Yreeke—Canadian economist
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